Reconciliation of anti-money laundering instruments and European data protection requirements in permissionless blockchain spaces by Karasek-Wojciechowicz, Iwona
Research Paper
Reconciliation of anti-money laundering
instruments and European data protection
requirements in permissionless blockchain
spaces
Iwona Karasek-Wojciechowicz *
Faculty of Law, Jagiellonian University in Krakow, 24 Golebia Street, 31-007 Kraków, Poland
*Correspondence address. Faculty of Law, Jagiellonian University in Krakow, 24 Golebia Street, 31-007 Kraków, Poland.
Tel: þ48-6-01-44-04-44; E-mail: iwona.karasek@uj.edu.pl
Received 19 March 2020; revised 17 August 2020; accepted 25 January 2021
Abstract
This article is an attempt to reconcile the requirements of the EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) and anti-money laundering and combat terrorist financing (AML/CFT) instru-
ments used in permissionless ecosystems based on distributed ledger technology (DLT). Usually,
analysis is focused only on one of these regulations. Covering by this research the interplay be-
tween both regulations reveals their incoherencies in relation to permissionless DLT. The GDPR
requirements force permissionless blockchain communities to use anonymization or, at the very
least, strong pseudonymization technologies to ensure compliance of data processing with the
GDPR. At the same time, instruments of global AML/CFT policy that are presently being imple-
mented in many countries following the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force, coun-
teract the anonymity-enhanced technologies built into blockchain protocols. Solutions suggested in
this article aim to induce the shaping of permissionless DLT-based networks in ways that at the
same time would secure the protection of personal data according to the GDPR rules, while also
addressing the money laundering and terrorist financing risks created by transactions in anonym-
ous blockchain spaces or those with strong pseudonyms. Searching for new policy instruments is
necessary to ensure that governments do not combat the development of all privacy-blockchains
so as to enable a high level of privacy protection and GDPR-compliant data processing. This article
indicates two AML/CFT tools which may be helpful for shaping privacy-blockchains that can enable
the feasibility of such tools. The first tool is exceptional government access to transactional data
written on non-transparent ledgers, obfuscated by advanced anonymization cryptography. The tool
should be optional for networks as long as another effective AML/CFT measures are accessible for
the intermediaries or for the government in relation to a given network. If these other measures are
not available and the network does not grant exceptional access, the regulations should allow gov-
ernments to combat the development of those networks. Effective tools in that scope should target
the value of privacy-cryptocurrency, not its users. Such tools could include, as a tool of last resort,
state attacks which would undermine the trust of the community in a specific network.
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Introduction
The last two decades have seen the intensive global development of
measures to fight money laundering, terrorist financing and counter
financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [anti-
money laundering and combat terrorist financing (AML/CFT)],
which are in constant tension with the protection of privacy. The
primary sources of global AML/CFT policies are standards and rec-
ommendations of Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The FATF
members, which are governments and supra-national regional
organizations, currently represent major financial centres in all parts
of the world. The FATF standards and recommendations form the
most influential global AML/CFT policies in effect today. They do
not bind directly the individuals and organizations but the FATF
members are obliged to implement these standards and recommen-
dations in their national legislation [1]. In that way there become
binding for individuals and organizations. In the EU, the FATF poli-
cies and standards are implemented in the AML Directives [2]. I do
not refer in this article to the provisions of national regulations be-
cause the source of the problem analysed here lies at a higher (glo-
bal) level, namely, in the policies set up by FATF.
The last few years have also seen intensive developments con-
cerning data/privacy protection regulations. The EU General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) [3] is one of the most stringent stand-
ards [4, 5] in this area. It has inspired more and more new regula-
tions globally, also including certain US state laws [6, 7] and
Chinese regulations [8]. Therefore, this model of regulation has a
massive impact on shaping global technology. In contrast to the
AML/CFT area, there is no comparable global inter-governmental
organization which sets the global standards for regulations in the
realm of data/privacy protection. Thus, to analyse the interplay be-
tween the global AML/CFT policy and data/privacy protection law,
I could not refer to any global data protection standard. The global
models of data/privacy protection are developed in a non-
centralized way: more and more countries, adopting their data pro-
tection regulations, shape these regulations in a way more or less
similar to the GDPR, as one of few models of regulation. Therefore,
the GDPR, being a binding law in the EU, becomes at the same time
one of the few influential global standards for data protection regu-
lations [5]. Its broad territorial scope of application also determines
its global significance.1 Thus, an analysis of the interplay between
global AML/CFT policy and the GDPR as one of the global stand-
ards for data protection regulation—the scope of this research—is
both justified and practically significant.
There is a constant tension between personal data protection and
crime-prevention policies. The 1990s were a battleground for
Internet openness, one in which law-enforcement bodies lobbied for
providers of data and communication services to engineer their
products so that they were guaranteed access to all data (‘exception-
al access’) [9]. A compromise has been achieved, which shares simi-
lar characteristics in many countries around the world. Generally
speaking, the Internet was left as a space free from direct instru-
ments enabling law enforcement, such as exceptional access [9],
while within the financial services sector, the protection of public
interest has prevailed over ensuring privacy. Financial institutions
and providers of asset management services have become “obliged
entities” under the AML/CFT regulations, being obliged to apply
measures to minimize the risks of money laundering and terrorist
financing (ML/FT). These duties include an obligation to identify
and, to some extent, to verify the identity of their clients, commonly
referred to as ‘Know Your Customer’ (KYC). There is also an obli-
gation to continually monitor clients’ activities to identify ML/FT
risks and report the outcomes of these analyses to national financial
intelligence units (FIU).
Obliged entities are required to have a permanent ‘exceptional
access’ to customer data, including details of their customers’ trans-
actions. The FIU do not have direct access to the operating systems
of financial service providers, but they do receive suspicious activity
reports, which are provided by obliged entities. The scope of obliged
entities has been constantly expanding over the years. Functionally,
this tool ensures ‘exceptional access’ of state authorities to the per-
sonal data gathered by obliged entities. Moreover, this access is con-
nected with customers’ KYC obligations imposed on service
providers. The costs of complying with these auditing and reporting
requirements for obliged entities are so huge that for several years,
obliged entities proposed that governments should take over direct
‘exceptional access’ to their operating systems, thereby potentially
removing a significant part of their costly reporting obligations [10].
The EU policymakers are already exploring opportunities to auto-
mate such supervisory processes and to create direct automated
reporting utilities (so-called regulatory technology) [11, 12] based
on permissioned distributed ledger technology (DLT). Embedded
supervision may result in governments taking over ‘exceptional ac-
cess’ to the operating systems of financial services providers.
Presently, however, governments have already ensured ‘exceptional
access’ based on the reporting obligations of obliged entities.
At the same time, entities which are obliged to implement AML/
CFT measures are also obliged to ensure data protection as required
by data protection regulations; for example, by the GDPR, if applic-
able. In case of conflict between those two protected values, the
GDPR recognizes the primacy of AML regulatory tools.2 The recon-
ciliation of those duties placed on obliged entities by both groups of
regulations results in a necessity of ensuring very high standards of
protection against unauthorized data access and, at the same time, a
necessity of providing safe ‘exceptional access’ that allows such enti-
ties to monitor their clients and to report to the supervisory bodies.
For example, banks are not allowed to implement end-to-end en-
cryption of transactional data generated by their clients. Some brief-
ly mentioned characteristics of AML/CFT policy show that the
policy is currently based on obligations imposed on service providers
(intermediaries), which enable the FIU to access these surveillance
data.
The above-mentioned mechanism has ensured the protection of
data gathered by intermediaries, as well as achieving the goals of
AML. It worked well until permissionless blockchains3 emerged and
cryptocurrencies4 began to be used for payment or investment pur-
poses. Unlike the Internet, the space of permissionless blockchains is
designed for the transfer of value. According to some views, the per-
missionless blockchain spaces can be a world without intermediaries
[14–16], but in fact new categories of intermediaries (such as decen-
tralized exchanges, wallet providers, and decentralized applications
1 Article 3 GDPR.
2 Recital 19 GDPR.
3 This article covers the whole of distributed-ledger technologies (DLT),
though the term is used interchangeably with the term ‘blockchain’ in
this paper, which is the most well-known type of DLT.
4 In this article, I use the term ‘cryptocurrency’ to refer to schemes charac-
terised by the following features: decentralised organization governed by
a network protocol, cryptography as means to secure transactions, and a
public ledger that documents the system’s state and history [13]. The cat-
egory of ‘cryptocurrency’ includes also ‘virtual assets’, which are defined
below.
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operators) have appeared in and around DLT ecosystems [16, 17].
Because permissionless DLT-based systems must include intermedia-
ries to maintain the wide acceptance of their cryptocurrencies, the
AML/CFT duties imposed on intermediaries are still necessary.
When parties transact peer-to-peer using non-custodian wallets,
key financial transactional data have been written on a blockchain
ledger. The content of these publicly viewable ledgers has become
the essential source of information for intermediaries which are
obliged to verify the ML/FT risks. Intelligence agencies monitor
blockchain ledgers which store details of all transactions (their
proofs). These entities try (sometimes successfully) to detect the ML/
FT risks by analysing the content of blockchain ledgers and enor-
mous amounts of external data (as far as available), based on the
use of advanced analytical mechanisms and technologies [18–22].
Access to resources needed to conduct such analysis differs between
states and intelligence companies. As a result, intelligence does not
often succeed with re-identification of suspected users or ML/FT
risks.
We now come to a source of one of the challenges concerning
permissionless blockchains. To ensure data confidentiality in a pub-
licly viewable database (blockchain ledgers), the GDPR requires, in
general terms, very strong capacity for ‘masquing’ personal data on
ledgers to prevent unauthorized access and identification of data
subjects. In contrast, AML/CFT policy combats anonymity-
enhanced technologies and mechanisms that hinder or prevent law
enforcement agencies from identifying users and connecting and
tracking transactions on blockchain ledgers. Thus, in my opinion,
the GDPR thereby pushes permissionless blockchains to ensure
strong pseudonymization or anonymity, while the AML combats
the strong pseudonymization or anonymity with the aim of being
able to analyse the ledgers’ content. These very general observations
are a starting point for further analysis regarding transparency ver-
sus anonymity requirements as regards the permissionless DLT-
based networks.
Policy makers have not addressed this concern thus far.
Sometimes it is mentioned but not further analysed. For example,
Finck, in her Study for the EU Parliament, indicates that if any ‘ano-
nymization’ technology is able to reach the GDPR’s anonymization
threshold, in turn, ‘the resulting anonymity can be problematic
when examined through the lens of other policy requirements, such
as that of tax evasion or antiterrorism legislation’ [23]. However,
Barsan dives deeper into that problem and proposes a solution [24]
which is analysed in this article in section ‘Searching for solutions—
analysis of existing proposals’.
The following sections begin with a short description of users’
identification possibilities in permissionless networks. Then I present
the basics of GDPR, showing with more detail how the GDPR is
related to actors in the blockchain space. The possible ways for the
GDPR-compliant processing of data on publicly viewable block-
chains ledger are analysed. The focus is mostly concentrated on the
determination of the GDPR’ threshold of data anonymity. These
sections, mostly descriptive, also includes my own analysis. Next,
the FATF’s AML/CFT global policy towards permissionless block-
chains is presented as well as its impact on shaping permissionless
network development. Then, the tensions between the regulations
are analysed, as well as the impact on data/privacy protection.
Already existing approaches aimed at reconciling the GDPR with
AML/CFT policy concerning permissionless DLT-based platforms
are briefly presented and analysed. Finally, my proposal towards
such solutions is presented along with a discussion on arising
concerns.
Transparency versus anonymity: The
identification of parties to transactions on
permissionless blockchains
The FATF, in accordance with the G20 (point 17 in [25]), stresses
that anonymity risks have emerged in decentralized systems [26].
Consequently, measures for combating anonymity-enhanced crypto-
currencies and their underlying technologies must be developed and
implemented into national systems (point 98 in [27]. At the same
time, the EU Blockchain Observatory states that ‘[t]here is often a
misconception that users of blockchain-based platforms are an-
onymous and therefore can act with impunity. Quite the contrary,
platforms like Bitcoin offer pseudonymity at the most’ [17].
Such contradictory statements concerning the anonymity in
blockchain spaces result from a differing understanding of the con-
cept of ‘anonymity’ adopted by the GDPR when compared with
AML/CFT policies. The GDPR sets the anonymity threshold very
high [28]. Therefore, from the perspective of the GDPR, the vast
majority of DLT permissionless implementations—if not all of them
[29, 30]—only ensure the pseudonymization of data written on
blockchain ledgers. The FATF recommendations are not coherent
nor precise in distinguishing anonymization techniques from those
that guarantee strong pseudonymization. Sometimes such a distinc-
tion is made (point 98 in [27]), but usually AML/CFT recommenda-
tions use the term ‘anonymity’ to cover both strong
pseudonymization and anonymization technologies and their data-
masquing outcomes. Thus, anonymity under AML/CFT policies
means, both (i) the impossibility or near impossibility of linking
data on a ledger with an identified person(s), and also (ii) a situation
when such a linking is ‘only’ significantly hampered (point 4 in
[27]). In a situation when data on public ledgers are qualified only
as pseudonymous under the GDPR, law enforcement agencies may
not be able to quickly identify the person hidden behind these specif-
ic pseudonymous data, for example, under a Bitcoin or Monero ad-
dress, to effectively mitigate the AML/CFT risks. The AML/CFT
policies tend to understand anonymous data or anonymization tech-
nologies very broadly. Therefore, the same data could be qualified
as pseudonymous under the GDPR and as anonymous under AML
policies. We should bear that difference in mind, because it can lead
to misunderstandings in the debate between policy makers and
researchers in the scope of data protection and AML.
Moving now to the transparency issues in blockchains, it should
be emphasized that, because of the technological diversity of DLT,
the chances of users’ identification by law enforcement agencies dif-
fer significantly between networks and also inside the individual sys-
tems. The traceability and linkability of the transactions are
impacted by many factors—which, ultimately, and along with ac-
cessible data external to the public ledgers—can (but do not neces-
sarily) lead to user identification. State intelligence agencies and
private companies alike build tools to identify users of permission-
less networks based on the linkage data on ledgers with external
data available in public space and also by using machine learning
and statistical modelling [30]. Research projects have been launched
to develop novel data-driven techniques and solutions designed to
support law enforcement agencies charged with investigating crim-
inal or terrorist activities that involve virtual currencies [31]. As the
most ‘transparent’ blockchains (regarding the chances for transac-
tions traceability and users’ identification), are generally considered
these public ledgers that reveal the public addresses of the parties
and the value of the transaction concerned [32]. One example is the
Bitcoin blockchain, which keeps publicly viewable data that, when
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combined with external data, provide a relatively high chance of
identifying users (in comparison to other blockchain networks).
Conversely, in terms of the probability of identifying peer-to-
peer transaction parties, networks can deploy anonymity-enhanced
or strong pseudonymization technologies on the protocol level.
These are all commonly referred to as ‘anonymous’, ‘privacy-pre-
serving’ [33] networks or ‘privacy-blockchains’. Examples of the
most advanced anonymity-enhanced technologies and solutions
available today include homomorphic encryptions, multi-party com-
putation [34], ring signatures [35], bulletproofs [36], and a range of
zero-knowledge proofs [37–40]. Some of these technologies already
address future risks that are likely to arise due to the rapid develop-
ment of quantum computing [41].
Many privacy-preserving networks constantly improve their
anonymity-enhanced features. After assessing the Monero networks
as enabling a quite high level of traceability of transactions [42, 43],
the community implemented several protocol changes in the proto-
cols and network architecture. Their effectiveness was reassessed in
2019, and the researchers who carried out the assessment found that
Monero was currently resistant to tracking and tracing methods that
applied to other cryptocurrencies [30]. However, no precise delimi-
tation is possible between transparent and privacy-focused block-
chains. Rather, these two types of blockchains are at the beginning
and end of a scale; between these two points, other networks can be
located in different places. The likelihood of law enforcement agen-
cies identifying users varies from high to extremely low, both within
and among systems. Initially, the most popular blockchains were
highly transparent, and some recently created networks, such as
Ethereum 2.0, deploy anonymity-enhanced technologies at the
protocol level [44].
Solutions implemented at the protocol level are not the only es-
sential factors regarding user traceability. Users also obfuscate the
origin of coins individually using other mechanisms, which can hin-
der or entirely prevent the user from being identified. Examples of
these mechanisms include ‘good practice’ concerning the one-time
use of addresses [45], as well as using other tools such as mixers,
tumblers, or similar. Such mechanisms can be developed and used
independently by users or group of users. Users alternatively have at
their disposal services provided by third parties or by autonomous
smart contracts, like lightning networks, shapeshifting, or cross-
chain transaction tools that can also be used on transparent block-
chains. Researchers continuously develop methods of tracing trans-
actions when such services are used [46], also developing risk
scoring models related to following the coins derived from illicit ac-
tivity [47].
GDPR basics
In this section, simplified and basic information regarding the
GDPR is provided for the readers not familiar with that regulation.
It is often said that the GDPR gives control of personal data
back to the owners (data subjects) by established, comprehensive,
and general obligations of data controllers and processors [48].
Controllers and processors are obliged to process the personal data
in compliance with some core principles of the GDPR. A data sub-
ject has a set of rights against the (joint) controllers and processors.
The rights and obligations are not limited to the use of any particu-
lar technology or method of data processing. The GDPR adopts a
technology-neutral approach, setting out the required general effects
(principles of data processing and data subjects’ rights) without
prescriptions for how they may, and how they should, be achieved.
If a controller or a processor breaches their obligations or violates
any data subject’s rights, compensation can be awarded and super-
visory bodies may punish the violations by means of a severe fine.
‘Personal data’ is ‘any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person’, where an ‘identifiable person’ is a nat-
ural person who ‘can be identified, directly or indirectly’. The notion
of personal data includes pseudonymized personal data as well, that
is, data which ‘can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject
without the use of additional information’. Anonymous data stay
outside of the GDPR’s scope of application. The ‘processing’ of data
means any operation or set of operations performed upon data, such
as collection, recording, storage, use, disclosure by transmission or
dissemination, erasure, or destruction.
The general rules of data processing by controllers and process-
ors include, among others:
i. Lawfulness of data processing: processing needs a legal base;
the legal basis are limited by the GDPR5 including, for example,
(a) consent of data subject, (b) complaining by a controller with
legal obligations, or (c) the necessity of data processing’ for the
purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or
by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by
the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data
subject which require protection of personal data’.
ii. Purpose limitation: data should be ‘collected for specified, expli-
cit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a man-
ner that is incompatible with those purposes’.
iii. Data minimization: processed data should be ‘adequate, rele-
vant and limited to what is necessary for the purposes for which
they are processed’; the controller ‘shall implement appropriate
technical and organizational measures for ensuring that, by de-
fault, only personal data which are necessary for each specific
purpose of the processing are processed’.
iv. Transparency of data processing: data subjects should be
informed about, among other things, how and by whom the
data will be processed, for which purpose, to what extent the
personal data are or will be processed; data breach notifications
should be sent to data subjects and supervisory bodies within
short periods;
v. Data confidentiality: personal data must be processed in a man-
ner that ensures their security, ‘including protection against un-
authorized or unlawful processing and accidental loss,
destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organiza-
tional measures’.
vi. Accountability: the data controller is responsible for, and
should be able to demonstrate compliance with, the duties of
controllers.
The rights of data subjects against (joint) controllers and pro-
cessors include, among others:
i. To be informed regarding the controller’s identity and contact
details, purposes of the processing, data recipients, transferring
the data to third countries, and so on.
ii. To object to data processing; that right is important when data
are processed solely on the legal basis of satisfying the control-
ler’s ‘legitimate interests’: when a data subject objects to data
processing in such a situation, ‘the controller shall no longer
process the personal data unless the controller demonstrates
compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override
5 Article 6(1) GDPR.
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the interests, rights, and freedoms of the data subject or for the
establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims’.
iii. Right to be forgotten;6 when a data subject invokes that right,
the data controller and data processor are obliged ‘to erase’ the
personal data if a valid legal basis for further processing does
not exist.
When the GDPR meets DLT, the extremely controversial arises
of whether it is possible at all to comply with the data subject’s right
to be forgotten [49]. I will come back to that issue with further
details in the context of immutable distributed ledgers. Here I indi-
cate in general terms, that a data subject should have the right ‘to be
forgotten’ where the retention of his or her personal data infringes
the GDPR. In particular, a data subject should have the right to
have his or her personal data erased and no longer processed where
the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes
for which they are collected or otherwise processed, where a data
subject has withdrawn his or her consent or objects to the processing
of personal data concerning him or her, or where the processing of
his or her personal data does not otherwise comply with the
GDPR.7
The GDPR also introduced the rules regarding the relations be-
tween (joint) controllers and processors, as well as regulation of
data transfers to third countries or international organizations.
Some of those issues are presented in the subsection below. (For
more on the GDPR in general, see, for example, Kuner et al. [50],
and in the context of the DLT, see Finck[23]. For a presentation
highlighting the different approaches between the GDPR and US
privacy law, see Hoofnagle et al. [51].
How does the GDPR relate to the blockchain
actors?
This section presents a summary of the current state of discussion
that asks: how can it be determined which persons in and around
decentralized blockchain networks are to be subsumed under the re-
spective terms of the GDPR? I also consider the implications of the
recent development in the case law of the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) when drawing conclusions.
Data written on immutable and publicly viewable blockchain
ledgers include legal and illegal content, including child abuse
images [52]. Many of these data are also personal data. Personal
data may be information written on a ledger in plain text, as well as
in the form of hashes. Many hashes on ledgers can be attributed to
an identifiable person using ledger analysis or additional external
resources [53]. As a rule, hashes are considered to be pseudonymized
personal data [53–55]). According to the single opposing view [54],
hashes on DLT-based ledgers cannot be qualified as personal data
because these data are not used for concealing identities but for solv-
ing a technical problem: the double-spending problem. It must, how-
ever, be underlined that according to the GDPR, data attributed to
an identifiable person are to be qualified as personal data, regardless
of the purposes for which they are used. As a rule, no purposes of
personal data use exempt such data from the GDPR’s scope, unless
an exemption is established by law. Thus, in a typical situation,
every node in the DLT-based system processes a massive amount of
personal data. Users of permissionless networks, validators, and
miners usually serve as node operators when they install blockchain
clients and full or partial data ledgers. By ‘users of permissionless
networks’ I mean here the end users as well as the business users
(intermediaries) like decentralised applications (dApp) operators,
for example, decentralised exchanges (dExchanges) or wallet pro-
viders. There is already a scientific debate whether and, if so, which
of mentioned persons in and around decentralized blockchain sys-
tems should be qualified as a controller, joint controller, or proces-
sor. When one starts using a permissionless DLT-based network, it
is essential to assess the risk of one’s own liability for GDPR non-
compliance, unless one believes that one will stay unidentifiable or
unreachable for the law enforcement bodies and will avoid any
liability.
The GDPR defines a data controller as a person ‘which, alone or
jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the proc-
essing of personal data’; joint controllers are two or more controllers
who jointly determine the purposes and means of processing.
‘Processor’ means a person who ‘processes personal data on behalf
of the controller’. The CJEU has emphasized many times the need to
adopt a broad definition of controllership (para. 28 in [56]) and
joint controllership [57] to ensure the effective and complete protec-
tion of data subjects.
The CJEU emphasizes the necessity to qualify a person as a
(joint) controller or processor taking into account all circumstances
of a given case. In this regard, the following comments are only very
general indications. The qualification of network communities’
group of members (end users, business users, miners and validators,
developers) may be different in a specific case and may be different
even between members of each group. It depends primarily on the
level of decentralization of network governance, which differs sig-
nificantly from network to network and inside the same networks
may vary over time.
According to an almost unanimous view among academics, a
user who sends personal data (related to others) to the DLT-based
network is a controller of these data (para. 23 in [23, 58, 59]. That
statement is in line with CJEU case law. A person, only by ‘creating
opportunity’ for another person to process specific data, determines
the purposes and means of the processing. As a result, they are both
joint controllers (para. 35 in [56]). In the ‘Jehovan todistajat’ case,
the CJEU stated that a person who exerts influence over the process-
ing of personal data by others for their own purposes and who par-
ticipates, as a result, in the determination of the purposes and means
of that processing, may be regarded as a controller (para. 69 in
[57]).
That rule was recalled in the recent ‘Fashion ID’ case. By embed-
ding the Facebook ‘Like’ button on its website, the company
Fashion ID has exerted ‘a decisive influence’ over the collection and
transmission of website visitors’ personal data to the provider of
that plugin, which would not have occurred without that plugin
(paras 74–78 in [60]). It may be claimed that a DLT-based network
user who sends, or orders an intermediary to send, the personal data
to that network, exerts a decisive influence on processing these data
by all network nodes, miners, or validators, even if any of them, act-
ing alone, has no critical control over further data processing.
Some experts suggest that node operators, miners, and validators
should be qualified only as processors [23, 61]. Others argue that
the nodes’ operators are joint controllers, similar to the SWIFT oper-
ator which many experts have seen as a processor but which was fi-
nally qualified as a joint controller ( [23, 59, 62]. Differences in the
6 Article 17 GDPR. 7 Recital 65 GDPR.






/cybersecurity/article/7/1/tyab004/6166133 by guest on 23 M
arch 2021
qualification of blockchain communities’ members may have object-
ive and factual grounds: that is, differences inside the individual net-
works’ communities. As the Article 29 Working Party (A29WP)8
has pointed out, the concept of controllership ‘is intended to allocate
responsibilities where the factual influence is, and thus based on a
factual rather than a formal analysis’ [63].
Thus, if in a given case the community members jointly deter-
mine the goals of data processing, or, at least, if they jointly exert a
‘decisive influence’ over the means, I would say that in such a case
all members of a network’s community who take part in off-chain
network governance may be qualified as joint controllers of personal
data written on a DLT ledger. ‘Means’ in the context of permission-
less blockchains refers to a software, its protocol, the network archi-
tecture, and the ledger.
The CJEU stated that the ‘Fashion ID’ case that a person cannot
be considered a controller in the context of operations that precede
or are subsequent in the overall chain of data processing operations,
for which that person does not determine either the purposes or the
means (para. 74 in [60]). That rule was formulated by the CJEU, as
suggested by the Advocate General, to avoid excessive legal conse-
quences of an expansive interpretation of joint control. However, it
must be noted that as regards communities of DLT-based permission-
less networks, which are operated under decentralized governance,
the scope of responsibility of a community’s members (core develop-
ers, miners or validators, nodes operators, users) will likely only
slightly be limited by applying such a rule. In the ‘Fashion ID’ case,
the Fashion ID, as website operator, did not exert any influence on
processing the data by Facebook (neither purposes nor means of
processing) when the data had been already transferred to Facebook.
However, when the user sends the data to the DLT-based network
that is under highly decentralized governance, this networks’ user still
co-exert decisive influence (with all other members of the commu-
nity) on how these data are further processed. It can be claimed that
usually all members of a permissionless blockchain community exert
such influence ‘jointly’ by using a commonly operated network. They
all support network operation to use and maintain such a network
and they all perform off-chain governance [23]. In a typical situation,
the network operation is in the interest of all such members of a net-
work community, although the interests of each group of members
are different. Thus, in my opinion, highly decentralized governance,
where any narrower group of decisive persons could not be identi-
fied, could result in joint responsibility of everybody who has co-
influenced how the data are processed on a permissionless DLT
ledger. The lack of a most influenced point(s) in the network’s gov-
ernance (i.e. a central operator) thus leads to the conclusion that
everybody who participated in off-chain governance jointly exerted
decisive influence over the means of processing. The view that no-
body controls the network cannot be accepted, because each network
is controlled by somebody: by a more or less wide group of commu-
nity members, coordinated by software (code) and the developed
rules of off-chain governance. Qualification of a network’s members
should always be decided, however, on a case-by-case basis and may
not be pre-determined in abstract. Sometimes a narrow group of
most influenced persons may be indicated within a community; net-
works bear significantly different levels and ways of governance’s de-
centralization [64]. No two networks are the same in terms of their
governance and control, and as a result, networks generate different
level of risk for their members in terms of GDPR compliance.
According to the so-called ‘household exemption’9 the GDPR is
exempted when data are processed by ‘a natural person in the course
of a purely personal or household activity’ (GDPR, however, applies
to controllers or processors which provide the means for processing
personal data for personal or household activities). It was right to
point out that it is unlikely to apply that exemption where a permis-
sionless blockchain is used, as in that case personal data are shared
with an indefinite number of people [23].
Until recently, academics have questioned the qualification of
core developers as (joint) controllers because they were considered to
be merely the creators of the tool (software) used to process data by
other entities [23]. However, in my opinion, the recent development
of CJEU case law paves the way for core developers to be subsumed
under the role of (joint) controllers. As the CJEU claims in the
‘Jehovan todistajat’ case, a person who exerts influence over the
processing of personal data by others—for personal purposes, even if
not for profit—may be regarded as a controller. To qualify a person
as a controller, it is enough that the person organizes, coordinates,
and encourages the processing of personal data by others. This per-
son does not need to have access to the data; sufficient is the person’s
knowledge, on a general level, that the processing of data by others is
being carried out [57]. In light of the above, core developers of per-
missionless networks could usually be qualified as joint controllers
because often they co-organize, coordinate, and encourage people to
use DLT-based permissionless networks designed by them. They do
it for their own financial or non-financial interest. The final assess-
ment, however, needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
The discussion above illustrates that where personal data are
processed on DLT-based permissionless ledgers under highly decen-
tralized governance, usually all the members within the DLT-based
networks’ community (users, nodes, miners or validators, develop-
ers) face a high legal risk of GDPR non-compliance. It is almost a
common view that most members of permissionless DLT-based net-
work communities could be subsumed under the respective GDPR
provisions as data (joint) controllers or, at least, as processors. The
more a network’s governance is centralized, the more probable it is
that only the most influenced group(s) of community members can
be qualified as (joint) controllers. However, even if the other com-
munity members are qualified as ‘only’ processors, they still suffer
the legal risk of being responsible under the GDPR’s provisions dir-
ectly concerning data subjects or supervisory bodies. A presentation
of controllers’ and processors’ liability rules is beyond the scope of
this article; interested readers may find that information in many
sources [23, 50].
In search of a permissionless blockchain that
enables GDPR-compliant data processing
It is emphasized that there is no such thing as a ‘GDPR-compliant
blockchain’—there are only GDPR-compliant use cases [61].
However, the crucial question is whether any permissionless block-
chain exists, or may exist at all, which functionally (by design) ena-
bles GDPR-compliant data processing. I will refer to such a
blockchain, which would by design enable GDPR-compliant proc-
essing of data stored on its ledger, as a ‘GDPR-compliant permis-
sionless blockchain’.
8 The Article 29 Working Party was an independent European working
party that dealt with issues relating to the protection of privacy and
personal. It has been replaced by the European Data Protection Board
(EDPB).
9 Article 2.2(c) GDPR.
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Below, I will briefly present some of the GDPR requirements
which members of blockchain ecosystems face if they are quali-
fied—under the GDPR—as controllers or processors.
Obligation to conclude agreements among joint
controllers of data
According to the GDPR,10 joint controllers should ‘in a transparent man-
ner determine their respective responsibilities for compliance with the
obligations under this Regulation, in particular as regards the exercising
of the rights of the data subject and their respective duties to provide the
information . . . by means of an arrangement between them . . .. The ar-
rangement . . . shall duly reflect the respective roles and relationships of
the joint controllers vis-à-vis the data subjects.’
Permissionless DLT networks are—at the protocol-layer level—
under the decentralized off-chain governance of their respective
communities. Concerning highly decentralized communities, the net-
works can comprise millions of network participants. For example,
in the near future, this may be the case of the permissionless
OpenLibra project [65]. Interactions between members of such com-
munity take place both on-chain, through procedures determined by
the network protocol, and off-chain. Concerning off-chain reac-
tions, each blockchain community creates its own ways and customs
of conducting off-chain communications [16, 17] that are either
slightly formalized or not formalized at all. Members of the commu-
nity are usually unable to identify each other unless they voluntarily
disclose their identities (as core developers often do). In the architec-
ture of permissionless networks any procedures or mechanisms have
not been introduced which could incentivize or force community
actors to disclose their identities within the community. Even if iden-
tification among network members is achievable, it would be un-
desirable as this might jeopardise security and trust within the
network. Core developers suggest the introduction of mechanisms
to discourage mutual identification, as this protects against poten-
tially dangerous collusions within the community [66].
The above implies that it is practically nearly impossible to con-
clude agreements, per GDPR requirements, among all highly decen-
tralized network actors qualified as joint controllers. Even if one
could argue that the ‘arrangements’ are already coded in the block-
chain protocol [24], it is unclear whether they can be qualified as
defining their responsibilities in a transparent manner (per GDPR
requirements). The software of permissionless DLT-based networks
is transparent in the sense that it is open source and can be audited
by anyone. However, use of the software does not create per se legal
obligations, nor does it determine those legal responsibilities with
which data controllers have to comply. Ultimately, networks’ proto-
cols and blockchain ledgers, as they currently stand, do not contain
all the elements required by GDPR for the arrangements.
Obligation to maintain a record of processing
activities
Each data controller under the GDPR is obliged to maintain a record of
processing activities regarding processed data11 which must contain,
among other items, ‘the name and contact details of the . . . joint control-
ler’. One of the obligations of a processor is maintaining a record of all
categories of processing activities, containing, among other items, the
name and the contact details of the processor or processors, as well as
those details for each controller on whose behalf the processor is acting.
However, even if a blockchain ledger was qualified under the GDPR as a
transaction register, it would not contain all the information required by
the regulations, as indicated above [24].
Transfer of data to third countries
According to the GDPR,12 any transfer of personal data to a third
country can take place only if, subject to the other special provi-
sions, the conditions laid down in the GDPR are complied with by
the controller and processor. The legal grounds for data transfer to
third countries are limited. The broadest basis for data transfer
which does not require any specific authorization is an adequacy de-
cision issued by the European Commission.13 This decision claims
that third country must ensure an ‘adequate’ level of protection, that
is, a level that is ‘essentially equivalent to that ensured within the
EU’.14 At the time of writing, there are only a few adequacy deci-
sions issued by the European Commission [67]. Recently, the CJEU
in the ‘Facebook and Schrems II’ case [68] ruled that an adequacy
decision related to the EU–US Privacy Shield is invalid because the
USA does not ensure an adequate level of personal data protection,
as required by the GDPR. In the absence of an adequacy decision, a
controller or processor may transfer personal data to a third country
if the controller or processor has provided appropriate safeguards,
and on the condition that enforceable data subject rights and effect-
ive legal remedies for data subjects are available.15
If a transfer may not be performed on the basis indicated above, and
none of the GDPR’s derogations for a specific situation are applicable, a
transfer may take place only if the transfer is not repetitive, concerns
only a limited number of data subjects, and is necessary for the purposes
of compelling legitimate interests pursued by the controller which are
not overridden by the interests or rights and freedoms of the data subject,
and if the controller has assessed all the circumstances surrounding the
data transfer and has on the basis of that assessment provided suitable
safeguards with respect to the protection of personal data.
In the context of a permissionless network, a controller’s or process-
or’s transfer of personal data to the network, where data may be proc-
essed by nodes and servers worldwide, may constitute the data transfer
to third countries. It is hardly (if at all) possible that controllers and pro-
cessors of data written on permissionless blockchain ledgers are able to
provide appropriate safeguards for data subjects where data are trans-
ferred to any country in the world to the non-identified nodes’ operators,
miners, or validators. Moreover, sending data to permissionless networks
seems to concern an unlimited number of data subjects. It is doubtful
whether in such situations legitimate interests pursued by the controller
are not overridden by the interests or rights and freedoms of the data
subject(s)—which should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
The right to be forgotten and the requirement to
minimize stored data
One of the most difficult GDPR obligations to fulfil concerning data
processing on public DLT-based ledgers is ensuring data removabil-
ity. This functionality is necessary for performing the right to be for-
gotten and for complying with data storage limitation
requirements.16 One of the obligations of a controller is the ‘erasure’
10 Article 26 GDPR.
11 Article 30 GDPR.
12 Article 44 GDPR.
13 Article 45 GDPR.
14 Recital 104 GDPR.
15 Article 46 GDPR.
16 Article 5.1(e) GDPR.
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of personal data on data subjects, without undue delay, if one of the
legal grounds applies.17 The controller should—both at the time of
determining a means for processing and at the time of processing—
implement appropriate technical and organizational measures
designed to implement data protection principles effectively, as well
as to integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing to meet
GDPR requirements and protect the rights of data subjects.18 It is
unclear whether the term ‘erasure’, as used by the GDPR, always
means ‘destruction’ [23], which as a principle would not be possible
on the blockchain-based ledgers. Essential and basic DLT features
include the integrity and immutability of data. These properties are
necessary to ensure the uniqueness of a given datum and to exclude
double spending. Removing these features to achieve data erasure
would be contrary to the essence of this technology.
DLT legers may be changed via forks. However, these forks do
not ensure a data removal mechanism as required by the GDPR.
Introducing forks in highly decentralized networks is often too
much of a time-consuming process. This process also often fails to
achieve its desired result: the removal of data from the ledger. In the
case of a hard fork, data may not be removed from one of forked
chains which is supported by less computing power and by the mem-
bers who do not accept the data removal (as was the case of The
Dao hack and the Ethereum fork).
According to the Austrian Data Protection Authority, data con-
trollers enjoy flexibility regarding the technical means of realizing
erasure, and anonymization itself can be considered as a means of
realizing data erasure [69]. An often-proposed solution to this data
erasure issue is private key destruction [23]. The French Data
Protection Authority suggests [70] that the deletion of the keyed
hash function’s secret key would have ensured a similar effect to
‘data erasure’ under the GDPR. In case of deletion of the keyed hash
function’s secret key, proving or verifying which information has
been hashed would no longer be possible. In practice, the hashed in-
formation would no longer pose a confidentiality risk [70].
In my opinion, this interpretation of the concept of ‘deletion’ of
digital data corresponds to the objectives of the GDPR. The physical
destruction of data is not required when technologies are available
to ensure that there is no linkage between the particular data and
the individual, while taking into account ‘all the means reasonably
likely to be used’.19 The mechanisms suggested by national data pro-
tection supervisors for ensuring the deletion of data compliant with
the GDPR—anonymization and the destruction of private keys ena-
bling access to the identifiers—are not two alternative ways of
ensuring the feasibility of the right to be forgotten, but they are com-
plementary solutions. The destruction of the controller’s private key
that provides access to personal data can only be considered as an
effective means of deleting data by this controller if those data which
are still stored on the public ledger are processed anonymously (in
relation to the given controller). This case will arise if, after destroy-
ing the keys, the given controller is unable to determine the same in-
formation and connect it to the identifiable person merely by using
data that are publicly viewable on ledgers or through additional
data that they, or a third party, possess, taking into account ‘all the
means reasonably likely to be used’.20 If, after destroying the access
keys, the controller is still able to link the data stored on the ledger
with the natural person (e.g. by analysing the content of public ledg-
ers and external data that the controller could access, taking into
account all those means that have a reasonable likelihood of being
used), then, despite the destruction of keys, the erasure of data has
not taken place under the GDPR. The destruction of keys which
give access to data stored on a ‘transparent’ blockchain cannot usu-
ally be considered to be a removal of personal data. To reach the
threshold of ‘anonymity’ under the GDPR, the destruction of access
keys by a data controller should have to be similar to the physical
deletion of data. This effect may be achieved only if the data proc-
essed by the controller (and all joint controllers) on the public ledger
are deeply masqued to reach the GDPR threshold of anonymity. If
the data still stored and processed on the blockchain (after deleting
the key) are only pseudonymous, then the private-key deletion
would not ensure the erasure of these data.
The above position seems to be in line also with the recent view
of The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity. The Agency
states that ‘in cases that the data controllers process the personal
data in a way that they cannot identify the individuals (e.g. in proc-
esses where the additional information allowing for re-identification
has been deleted by the controller. . .) [I]n such cases and depending
on the technique used, this way of processing might actually lead ef-
fectively to data anonymization’ [71]. Therefore, as I emphasize
above, to ensure this result, those data that are still processed by the
controller on the public ledger (following the key deletion) should
be the anonymized data.
In conclusion, ensuring data-removal mechanisms from the
blockchain requires the anonymization of data recorded on its pub-
lic ledger.
Anonymization of data on blockchains
It is doubtful whether the data recorded on public ledgers can be
qualified, under the GDPR, as anonymized data in situations in
which the user (data subject) still retains access to its identifiers,
such as public and private keys/addresses and the transaction
value.21 On privacy-blockchains, some data (depending on the
blockchain protocol) are masqued by zero-knowledge cryptography,
but they are still visible to the user. Can anonymous data under the
GDPR be considered anonymous in relation to controllers and pro-
cessors if they are not anonymous in relation to the data subject?
Access to the identifiers by the data subject could allow them to link
data stored on the public ledger with their person, even if no other
person can do this. Concerning cloud computing, it was stated that,
where the user is the only person who is able to access reunified
shards of their stored data, then, at least pursuant to a relative ap-
proach to the concept of personal data (see the next section), ‘the
data may be personal data to the user, but not to anyone else’
[23, 75].
Although interpreting the concept of personal data, there is a
need to refer to the dispute about the ‘relative’ versus ‘absolute’ ap-
proach concerning such data. According to the relative approach to
personal data, when assessing a person’s traceability based on spe-
cific data, the individual capabilities and perspectives of a particular
controller should be considered. If additional data which are needed
for identification are in the possession of a third party, then an
examination should be carried out to determine whether a particular
controller has the ability to access and use these data, within their
own means, to identify the person. According to the opposing
17 Article 17 GDPR.
18 Article 25 GDPR.
19 Recital 26 GDPR.
20 Recital 26 GDPR.
21 The A29WP defines an identifier as piece of information that holds a
particularly privileged and close relationship with an individual, allow-
ing for his or her identification [72, 73, 74].
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absolute approach, when assessing the possibility of connecting in-
formation (data) with a specific person, all available information—
regardless of who possesses that information and whether the con-
troller is able to obtain it from a third party—should be taken into
account (paras 52–53 in [76, 77]).
The leading CJEU case in that scope is the ‘Breyer’ case, C-582/
14 [78]. The court stated that ‘there is no requirement that all the in-
formation enabling the identification of the data subject must be in
the hands of one person’ (para. 31 in [78]). However, Finck stresses
that since the CJEU assessed the nature of the data by analysing the
controller’s ability to obtain additional data from the third party for
the purpose of identification, this indicates that the CJEU has
adopted a relative approach [23, 53]. However, the CJEU has also
significantly reduced the effects of narrowing the data protections
resulting from a relative approach by ruling that the possibility of a
controller obtaining additional data from a third party should be
interpreted broadly. Namely, the additional information needed for
identification (and that is also in possession of a third party) may be
omitted when assessing whether the controller can use it for identifi-
cation purposes, but only if the controllers’ access to the data in the
third party’s possession ‘was prohibited by law or practically impos-
sible on account of the fact that it requires a disproportionate effort
in terms of time, cost and man-power, so that the risk of identifica-
tion appears in reality to be insignificant’ (para. 46 in [78]).
Although these criteria are related to DLT, I would claim that, if the
level of data masquing on the ledgers has reached the anonymization
threshold, and if only the user has access to the identifiers, then link-
age of data on the public ledger with a data subject would be impos-
sible for any controller without the use of information possessed by
that data subject. In a typical situation, it can be considered practic-
ally impossible for the data controller to obtain the additional data
from the data subject (taking into account that it requires a dispro-
portionate effort in terms of time, cost, and workforce). It is so be-
cause if the anonymization techniques are used, usually it would be
practically impossible for the data controllers to identify and find
the user in possession of this additional information needed to iden-
tify this data subject. Of course, any assessment should always be
made on a case-by-case basis.
Consequently, maintaining by the user (data subject) its exclu-
sive access to the identifiers (such as public and private keys and
transaction value) does not preclude the qualification of data stored
on a public ledger as ‘anonymous’ in the GDPR’s meaning.
Reaching the GDPR data anonymization
threshold
The analysis of the presented GDPR requirements in the context of
the DLT and decentralized governance of permissionless networks
shows that some GDPR requirements are practically impossible to
implement in highly decentralized DLT-based networks. These
would become feasible (or almost feasible) for networks after their
transformation into permissioned systems, or after strengthening the
network centralization, which, in turn, would undermine the trust
in permissionless DLT and thereby result in the loss of permission-
less DLT’s practical importance. Therefore, in my opinion, the
GDPR leaves only one option available for permissionless networks
to create a protocol enabling GDPR-compliant processing of data
written on the ledger: implementing the technology which will
ensure the anonymization of data stored on the ledger. The GDPR
does not apply to anonymized data.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the data anonymization
GDPR’ threshold is currently reachable on permissionless block-
chains or whether it may be reachable in the future (in a broader
technological context, see Purtova [28]). Any information regarding
an identified or identifiable natural person is personal data.22 Data
that do not relate to an identifiable natural person are considered to
carry anonymous information. According the GDPR, to determine
whether a natural person is identifiable, ‘account should be taken of
all the means reasonably likely to be used, either by the controller or
by another person to identify the natural person directly or indi-
rectly. . . To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be
used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all
objective factors . . . taking into consideration the available technol-
ogy at the time of the processing and technological developments’.23
As Finck points out, the criterion for determining whether data are
anonymous is the likelihood of identification; identification should
not be likely through reliance on all the means reasonably likely to
be used [23, 53].
According to the opinion of A29WP, ‘anonymization results
from processing personal data in order to irreversibly prevent identi-
fication’ [79], and ‘the outcome of anonymization as a technique
applied to personal data should be, in the current state of technol-
ogy, as permanent as erasure, that is, making it impossible to process
personal data’ [79]. To the A29WP, a risk-based approach seems to
be insufficient: ‘it deems that the risk of identification must be zero’
[23, 80]. However, in the same opinion, the A29WP indicates that
‘a residual risk of identification is not a problem if no one is reason-
ably likely to exploit it’ [79]. Consequently, the opinion of A29WP
within this scope may be regarded as unclear, leaving space for op-
posite interpretations concerning the required threshold of
anonymization.
The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity has recently
expressed its view regarding the GDPR’ threshold of anonymization.
This opinion is important because it takes into account the further
development of technology following the previous opinion of the
A29WP. Moreover, it is highly possible that the European Data
Protection Board will henceforth follow the position of the
European Union Agency for Cybersecurity in his future opinion,
long-awaited by the business community, regarding the data protec-
tion in the context of permissionless networks. In a recent recom-
mendation (2019) of the Agency on shaping technology according
to data protection and privacy provisions [74], the Agency defined
anonymization as a ‘process by which personal data is irreversibly
altered in such a way that a data subject can no longer be identified
directly or indirectly, either by the data controller alone or in collab-
oration with any other party’ [74]. Although the Agency expressly
referred to the GDPR, the above-cited definition is not taken from
the GDPR but from the ISO Standards for ‘Health informatics—
Pseudonymization’ (point 3.2. in [81]). In the ISO comment to this
Standard, it is indicated that the concept of anonymity ‘is absolute,
and in practice, it may be difficult to obtain’ (point 3.2. in [81]).
One might think that the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity
only mistakenly omitted the definition of GDPR, basing its under-
standing of ‘anonymity’ on the ISO definition instead—but this is
not the case. In its previous report, the Agency clearly quoted the
GDPR (and not the ISO) definition of personal data, stated that be-
fore characterizing data as anonymous, cautiously should be
answered the question: ‘as to whether it is really impossible for any
22 Article 4(1) GDPR. 23 Recital 26 GDPR.
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party—including the data controller—to identify from these data
any individuals’ [82]. The requirement of data to be ‘really impos-
sible to identify’ may be interpreted as adoption by the Agency of an
absolute (zero-risk) approach. As noted above, however, this pos-
ition is not justified either in the text of GDPR or in CJEU case law.
Therefore, it is worth noticing that current difficulties in finding ef-
fective anonymization techniques may not lie with the technology it-
self, which seems to be developed enough, but with faulty
interpretations of the EU regulations by some EU supervisory
bodies.
However, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, adopt-
ing the absolute approach for data anonymization (hardly, if at all,
achievable in practice [53]), at the same time indicates that zero-
knowledge proofs and the broader area of attribute-based creden-
tials fall within the group of ‘techniques that can effectively be used
to increase anonymization’ [74]. This statement, in turn, could be
interpreted as a deviation of the Agency from an absolutist ap-
proach. We should also bear in mind that the determination of a
given technology or mechanism as guaranteeing data anonymization
might not be possible in general. As has been emphasized, the risk of
identification must be assessed on a case-by-case basis [23]; each set
of data has in its own unique set of circumstances, and no one
method of identifying an individual is considered ‘reasonably likely’
to identify individuals in all cases [83].
If not data anonymization, then what?
The architecture of permissionless networks, their governance, and
deployed technologies vary substantially. It is not unlikely that, in
the future, DLT-based permissionless networks would be able to
cope with the GDPR requirements. One example of such techno-
logical progress is exemplified by the recently announced proof of
concept of a redactable blockchain, a prospective solution to the
right to be forgotten [84]. Researchers proposed to accommodate
editing operations in the blockchain by extending the block struc-
ture to include another copy of the transaction’s Merkle root. The
edit operation is performed by replacing the original block with the
other (candidate) block based on miners’ voting on the user’s edit re-
quest [84]. This newly proposed solution has not yet been widely
assessed. If successfully tested, it could become a prospective useful
means for the sporadic deletion of data concerning the data subject’s
demand to be forgotten, or else it might be used for the erasure of il-
legal or harmful data stored on public ledgers in plain text [85, 86].
However, adapting this tool to meet the GDPR requirement of data
minimization would remain a huge challenge. The fulfilment of this
obligation may lead to mass and frequent data erasure after the ex-
piration of the retention period,24 raising questions regarding the se-
curity and trustfulness of such redactable permissionless
blockchains. There is a need for further research into whether this
proposed solution, based on miners’ voting, could also be adapted
to fulfil the GDPR principle of data minimization.
Thus, it cannot be excluded from the realm of possibility that fu-
ture permissionless DLT developments could bring effective means
of data erasure and other means that enable to meet other GDPR
requirements. However, even if data anonymization is no longer ne-
cessary to exclude the applicability of the GDPR, in that situation,
implemented pseudonymization techniques of the data written on
blockchain ledgers would have to be very strong because block-
chains ledgers are publicly viewable. According to the GDPR confi-
dentiality principle, data ought to be ‘processed in a manner that
ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protec-
tion against unauthorized or unlawful processing. . . using appropri-
ate technical or organizational measures’.25 Therefore, in order to
meet the confidentiality requirement related to the processing of per-
sonal data, it would be necessary to use advanced pseudonymization
techniques which would effectively protect the data subject against
reverting the pseudonymous nature of these data by unauthorized
third persons. Such techniques should be almost near the anonym-
ization threshold because if the pseudonymized data allowed any
third persons to identify users easily after reading the data on ledg-
ers, the confidentiality principle of data processing would not be
met by the data controller and the data processor.
Anti-money laundering and combating the
financing of terrorism policy instruments in
permissionless blockchain spaces
The above analysis shows that GDPR requirements for personal
data protection push permissionless blockchain-based networks to-
wards ensuring the anonymization of data processed on a public
ledger. Ensuring data anonymization is currently needed if public
ledgers are to enable GDPR-compliant data processing on ledgers by
data controllers and data processors. However, at the same time, the
privacy-blockchains which use anonymity-enhanced technologies,
as well as their native privacy-coins, are combated by AML/CFT
policies. Generally speaking, intermediaries are not allowed to trade
or manage such virtual assets as far as they are unable to mitigate
AML/CFT the risks posed by privacy-coins. Advanced anonymiza-
tion technologies, needed to protect personal data, are not accept-
able by AML/CFT policies. This section presents some tools of
global AML/CFT policy and describes their impact on shaping the
architecture and protocols of permissionless blockchain-based
networks.
Financial action task force recommendations for
anti-money laundering and combating the
financing of terrorism policy in relation to virtual
assets
In 2018, the FATF updated its Standards [87] to clarify their appli-
cation to virtual assets26 and the virtual asset service provider
(VASP).27 In 2019, FATF issued the Guidance [27] further clarifying
24 Article 5.1(e) GDPR, Recital 39 GDPR.
25 Article 5.1(f) GDPR.
26 According to the FATF Standards (2019) [87], a ‘virtual asset’ is a
‘digital representation of value that can be digitally traded, or trans-
ferred, and can be used for payment or investment purposes. Virtual
assets do not include digital representations of fiat currencies, securities
and other financial assets that are already covered elsewhere in the
FATF Recommendations’. In its earlier documents, the FATF mainly
used the concept of ‘virtual currency’. However, following the most re-
cent amendments to FATF Standards, a new term of ‘virtual assets’
appears, even though the concept of ‘cryptocurrency’ is still used by the
FATF in the term ‘anonymity-enhanced cryptocurrency’. Consequently,
I use FATF terminology in this article.
27 According to the FATF Standards (2019) [87], ‘“Virtual asset service
provider” means any natural or legal person who is not covered else-
where under the Recommendations, and as a business conducts one or
more of the following activities or operations for or on behalf of an-
other natural or legal person: (i) exchange between virtual assets and
fiat currencies, (ii) exchange between one or more forms of virtual
assets, (iii) transfer of virtual assets, (iv) safekeeping and/or






/cybersecurity/article/7/1/tyab004/6166133 by guest on 23 M
arch 2021
the FATF’s previous amendment to the Standards relating to virtual
assets [83, 84]. FATF’s Standards (2019) recommend establishing
AML/CFT measures that are related to both governmental bodies
and the VASP. These obligations require governments to assess and
mitigate risks associated with virtual asset activities and VASP. The
VASPs are to be licenced or registered or subject to supervision or
monitoring by national authorities. The governments are to imple-
ment sanctions and other enforcement measures when a VASP fails
to comply with their AML/CFT obligations [88]. In order to identify
those VASPs operating without a licence or registration, govern-
ments should consider non-publicly available information, as well as
web-scraping and open-source information, to identify online adver-
tising or possible solicitations for business by unregistered or un-
licensed entities (point 84 in [27]). FATF recommendations require
governments to impose on VASPs the obligations of assessment and
mitigation of ML/FT risks and the implementation of AML/CFT
preventive measures, including KYC, record-keeping, suspicious
transaction reporting, and screening all transactions for compliance
with targeted financial sanctions, among other measures applied to
any other entities in the financial industry [88].
Many of the VASP-related FATF recommendations directly ad-
dress virtual assets, including anonymity-enhancing currencies.
Several risk factors are highlighted in the FATF Guidelines, which
increase the risk of non-compliance with AML/CFT rules:
anonymity-enhanced features of technology and network architec-
ture; decentralized, unregistered, and unlicensed VASPs; disinter-
mediation of transactions; and peer-to-peer transactions (point 51 in
[27]). In order to meet the FATF requirements (as they are imple-
mented in systems of national law), the VASP must be able to prove
that they can manage and mitigate the risks of engaging in virtual
assets-related activities which involve the use of anonymity-
enhancing technologies or mechanisms, including but not limited to
anonymous-enhanced cryptocurrencies, mixers, tumblers, and other
technologies that obfuscate the identity of the sender, recipient,
holder, or beneficial owner of virtual assets (point 110 in [27]). If a
VASP cannot manage or mitigate the risks posed by engaging in
such activities, it should not be permitted to engage in such activities
(point 110 in [27]).
Finally, according to the 2019 FATF recommendations,
‘V[irtual] A[ssets] products or services that facilitate pseudonymous
or anonymity-enhanced transactions also pose higher ML/TF risks’
(point 98 in [27]). Countries should ‘consider the risk factors associ-
ated with the V[irtual] A[ssets] product, service, transaction, or de-
livery channel, including whether the activity involves
pseudonymous or anonymous transactions. . .. The fact that nearly
all V[irtual] A[ssets] include one or more of these features or charac-
teristics may result in countries determining that activities in this
space are inherently higher risk’ (point 28 in [27]). This statement
shows that, from an AML policy perspective, strong pseudonymiza-
tion techniques present nearly the same high risk as the anonymity-
enhanced techniques. Even if advanced cryptographic methods, such
as zero-knowledge proofs, are to be qualified according to the
GDPR as only pseudonymization techniques, for law enforcement
agencies to identify the users (data subjects) masqued by these tech-
niques remains extremely difficult. It does not depend on the qualifi-
cation of such masqued data under the GDPR as pseudonymous or
anonymous data. Advanced anonymization technologies exclude
effective counteracting of ML/FT risks—regardless of the technology
and data qualification—slightly below or slightly above the GDPR’s
anonymization threshold. Pseudonymization techniques can also ex-
clude a quick identification of network users and financial beneficia-
ries of transactions, which is crucial for preventing ML/FT risks.
Accordingly, strong pseudonymization technologies used within net-
works under decentralized governance should be combated today by
AML/CFT national regulation and by obliged entities with the same
intensity as technologies ensuring data anonymization according to
the meaning provided by the GDPR.
The impact of anti-money laundering and com-
bating the financing of terrorism measures on
anonymous permissionless blockchains
One characteristic of the present AML/CFT policy is its focus on
combating anonymization or strong pseudonymization techniques,
which seem to be perceived by the authors of regulatory instruments
as the primary sources of threat. In practice, AML requirements
force intermediaries (VASPs) to stop handling transactions when
instruments are used that impede the traceability of transactions on
the public ledger. In situations where these advanced privacy-
focused technologies are embedded in the protocol as non-optional
and the owner of virtual assets cannot remove these features, in that
situation, a VASP is not allowed to handle transactions involving
these virtual assets as it would not be able to mitigate AML/CFT
risks. Therefore, AML policy measures combat technologies which
are able to protect data on public ledgers at the level required by the
GDPR. Moreover, that policy pushes owners of such privacy-coins
towards peer-to-peer (or even off-chain) transacting on privacy-
focused blockchains or directs them to use inter-chain autonomous
tools.
Joint impact of the GDPR and AML/CFT policy
instruments on permissionless blockchain
spaces—The conclusion
The GDPR and AML/CFT policy instruments in permissionless
blockchain spaces are on a collision course: AML policy fights
anonymity-enhanced and strong pseudonymization technologies
deployed in permissionless DLT protocols. In practice, the obliga-
tion imposed on VASPs to refrain from involvement in transactions
in which they cannot mitigate ML/FT risks associated with virtual
assets results in VASPs refraining from engaging in transactions
which involve anonymity-enhanced (privacy-focused) cryptocurren-
cies [89]. At the same time, the only way for networks to ensure the
GDPR-compliance of data processing on public ledgers seems to be
data anonymization. As presented above, the whole community of
permissionless blockchains, especially the part which may be
reached by fines issued by the European data protection supervisory
bodies, has an interest in the exemption of the GDPR applicability
to their activities. As I pointed out above, one possibility (it seems
the only one) for removing the GDPR applicability is to design the
protocol and the whole networks architecture in such a way that all
data sent and written on the ledger would be anonymized in the
meaning of the GDPR. However, when such privacy-blockchains
are (or will be) operated, their users, and at the same time the users
administration of virtual assets or instruments enabling control over vir-
tual assets, and (v) participation in and provision of financial services
related to an issuer’s offer and/or sale of a virtual asset.’
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of privacy-coins, have no possibility to refer to supervized interme-
diaries (VASP). This hinders the development of such networks.
Moreover, it also induces designing of more and more tools to by-
pass regulated intermediaries by holders of privacy-coins. Thus,
there is a need to find and implement AML/CFT tools which would
be feasible and enforceable in anonymous cyberspaces, instead of
lowering the level of data/privacy protection at publicly viewable
ledgers.
As we can observe, the development of new permissionless DLT
networks seems going in the direction of enhanced protection of
privacy. The use of advancing anonymization techniques is needed
for blockchain communities to be GDPR-compliant and to avoid se-
vere fines. The increasing use of more and more advanced anonym-
ization techniques may eventually enable the processing of
anonymous data on permissionless networks’ ledgers, per the
GDPR. Advanced anonymization techniques, reaching the GDPR
level of data anonymization, should be accepted by global or nation-
al policies towards the permissionless DLT. However, to ensure that
the AML/CFT needs are met, the government(s) should search for
effective tools feasible and available in anonymous or strong pseud-
onymous cyberspace.
Searching for solutions: Analysis of existing
proposals
The tension between privacy and the needs of law enforcement
agencies is widely debated concerning different communication
technologies. For example, to facilitate acceptance by the govern-
ments of the end-to-end encryption used in messenger applications,
as well as to improve privacy in data surveillance instead of granting
states exceptional access into messenger applications, Segal et al.
[90] have proposed a lawful search of third parties’ records of data.
Concerning permissionless DLT-based networks, some interesting
approaches have been already proposed, such as, for example,
blacklisting [47] or collaborative deanonymization [91]. However,
only a few proposals address the protection of data according to the
rules required by the GDPR. They are discussed below.
Registration of the virtual currency addresses
in FIU
The Vth EU AML Directive28 recommends that the FIU should be
able to associate virtual currency addresses with the identity of the
owner of virtual currencies and further that the possibility for users
to self-declare to designated authorities on a voluntary basis should
be further assessed.
There is no doubt that for the FIU to become able to associate
virtual currency addresses to the identity of the owners of virtual
assets would be a desirable solution. However, neither the FATF rec-
ommendation nor the EU AML Directives provide technically and
legally feasible instruments for achieving this result. It is impossible
to build an effective AML/CFT policy based on the voluntary regis-
tration of all address owners. Each person can generate, within a
short time, any number of addresses they do not have to use. It is un-
clear why anyone would register an address without being legally
obligated. However, even if address registration were obligatory, the
anonymity or strong pseudonymity of blockchain users would prac-
tically prevent verification by the FIU, whether or not all addresses
generated for transactions on privacy-blockchains have been
reported to them. Finally, registering virtual currency addresses in
FIU would not be useful for crime prevention in situations of
anonymity-enhanced blockchains when the addresses of the transac-
tions’ parties are masqued. Linking the person to a specific address
would not allow for the traceability of their transactions. This prob-
lem is being partially addressed by the ‘travel rule’ imposed on the
VASPs according to the FATF recommendations, but that tool only
applies to transactions mediated by VASPs and leaves peer-to-peer
transactions outside its scope of application.
Lowering the GDPR personal data protection on
permissionless blockchains
Lowering the level of the GDPR data protection requirements for
public permissionless blockchains is proposed to solve this privacy–
transparency conundrum [24]. According to this approach, any low-
ering of the GDPR protection should reach a level that ensures the
right balance between the protection of personal data on permis-
sionless blockchains and the transparency necessary to deter crim-
inal behaviour. ‘Regulators need to talk with each other in order to
set the cursor at the right place’ [24]. Consequently, there should be
a corresponding change in regulations, particularly regarding the
GDPR and the AML [24]. According to this proposition, these
amendments to the law should require that permissionless networks
deploy only those technologies that ensure a certain, and not too
low, level of personal data protection. However, at the same time,
the networks should also provide a level of data protection that is
not too high to enable identifying users by the law enforcement
agencies, based on an analysis of data recorded on (transparent)
public ledgers. It has been debated how to set this appropriate bal-
ance between data protection and the requirement of ensuring trans-
parency. According to this proposal, only low-tech solutions—such
as the creation of several public keys, registering only hashed infor-
mation on ledgers, and using mixers—should be required by regula-
tion to protect the privacy and should be sufficient to protect
personal data on public blockchain-based ledgers. At the same time,
AML regulations should prohibit the use of ‘high-tech solutions’,
that is, advanced cryptographic methods such as zero-knowledge
proofs [24]. Thus, the analysed proposal strictly determines the tech-
nologies which should be used; overly strong pseudonymization
technologies should be banned to ensure the right level of ledger
transparency, while technologies that are too weak (too transparent)
should be banned to ensure personal data protection.
The above solution does not seem to be appropriate, even with-
out considering the difficulties in qualifying different new technolo-
gies as too strong (‘high-tech’) or too weak (‘low-tech’) solutions.
Implementing this proposal would provide law enforcement agen-
cies with the necessary minimum degree of user traceability in per-
missionless space. On the other hand, this solution would allow any
third person other than governmental agencies to have ensured the
same level of user traceability and identifiability. Accordingly, the
proposal fails to ensure a sufficiently high level of user privacy pro-
tection against third persons other than governmental agencies. As
public ledgers are viewable for everyone, this failure is significant.
Lowering the requirements of data privacy protection on public
ledgers by banning the use of anonymity-enhanced technologies
does not protect users against the possibility of being identified by
the state or by any other actors. If the above solution were selected,
practically everyone would gain access to anyone else’s personal
28 Recital 9 Vth EU AML Directive.
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data on public ledgers. Therefore, as permissionless DLT ledgers are
publicly viewable and searchable by everyone, the GDPR require-
ments to ensure the confidentiality of data should not be lowered.
Lowering the required level of masquing personal data would ex-
pose data subjects to identification by anyone who has enough
knowledge and resources. Lowering the required level of masquing
data on DLT ledgers would also violate the GDPR principle of
technological neutrality. Moreover, the proposition suggests restrict-
ing instruments of personal data protection on public ledgers only to
the use of ‘low-tech’ solutions. However, these instruments are not
embedded by design in the blockchain protocol. The effective and
successful use of such instruments would not be an easy task for
average users. This approach would also violate the GDPR because
it is required that privacy protection instruments be built by design
into systems and their implementations should not burden data sub-
jects. Finally, mixers, tumblers, and similar ‘low-tech’ solutions may
effectively protect data subjects if such mechanisms are used simul-
taneously with anonymity-enhanced technologies that do not allow
for tracking and linking transactions. The suggested ban on
advanced anonymity-enhanced technologies would significantly re-
duce the effectiveness of accepted ‘low-tech’ solutions.
Certification mechanisms and codes of conducts
According to Finck, the certification mechanisms and codes of con-
duct may overcome difficulties in applying the GDPR obligations to
specific cases of personal data processing [23]. However, at the
same time, she underlines that codes of conduct and certification
mechanisms will not resolve the lack of compliance where there are
technical or governance limitations to compliance. In such cases,
these limitations could be addressed by interdisciplinary research on
these matters [99].
Indeed, certification mechanisms may be helpful for standardiza-
tion of solutions used by permissioned networks, but it is not the
case with permissionless systems which are under decentralized gov-
ernance. Certification mechanisms and codes of conduct are not
able, nor are they are allowed, to change the GDPR rules, for ex-
ample by removing all these problematic GDPR’ requirements
which seem not to be feasible to meet under decentralized govern-
ance of DLT-based networks (some of them have been indicated
above in the section ‘In search of a permissionless blockchain that
enables GDPR-compliant data processing’). The research work
should be done to identify solutions which can square permissionless
blockchains with the GDPR, but simultaneously not forgetting
about the needs of AML/CFT policies. Certification mechanism and
codes of contact cannot help until any feasible solution(s) to recon-
cile these two regulations become accepted by policy makers and
regulators.
Blacklisting
Another approach that should be discussed here, aimed at reconcili-
ation between the privacy and AML/CFT needs, is a blacklisting ap-
proach developed by Möser et al. [47]. By blacklisting suspected
transactions, the tool helps prevent the acceptance of coins derived
from illicit activity, and it requires intermediaries (and incentivizes
other users) to check coins against public blacklists of illicit funds
before accepting them. Blacklisting is enabled by the ability to fol-
low coins from one transaction to the next [92]. That system
requires traceability of transactions as a minimum. Thus, it could
work well on transparent blockchains, that is, on blockchains
which, as indicated above, create a high legal risk for almost all
community members of being responsible for the processing of per-
sonal data written on the blockchain ledger in contravention of the
GDPR.
To reconcile the GDPR and AML/CFT aims, however, an AML/
CFT policy tool is needed that would work in an anonymous block-
chain space (and which, in turn, may be acceptable, or at least less
risky, from the GDPR point of view).
The traceability of transactions needed for blacklisting systems is
something less than the possibility of user identification. The users’
identification is not needed to trace the transactions. Thus, in terms
of personal data/privacy protection, it is definitely a step in the right
direction which supports and strengthens the level of privacy
protection.
However, it would be a useful tool to resolve the problem ana-
lysed in the article if it were feasible on blockchains where anonym-
ous data were processed, that is, when the controllers and processor
had no possibility to link data written on the ledger (in hash form or
plain text) with data subjects, apart from a residual risk of identifi-
cation (as explained above). As pointed out above, because trace-
ability of some transactions on publicly viewable ledgers is today
possible (even if often it requires an extreme amount of resources)
and it also increases the chances for the users’ identification, it indi-
cates that the likelihood of data subjects identification is not only re-
sidual (identification at least of some data subjects is likely through
reliance on all the means reasonably likely to be used). However, as
presented above, it varies from network to network, as well inside
the networks. Moreover, transactions’ traceability increases the
chance of associating a whole chain of transactions with some exter-
nal data, which, in turn, increases the chances of identification of
some data subjects. Where zero-knowledge proof cryptography is
used, almost excluding the traceability of transaction, the blacklist-
ing system fails, taking into account its current development [92].
The designers of blacklisting noted that the concept might not be
feasible in all cryptocurrencies, especially those built on zero-
knowledge proof cryptography [92].
Thus, blacklisting can be feasible AML/CFT tools in relation to,
generally speaking, transparent blockchains, such as the Bitcoin
blockchain, even when different anonymity technologies or techni-
ques are used by their users [47, 92]. These blockchains, however,
do not enable, by design, the GDPR-compliant processing of data,
for example, (i) where all nodes process personal data written on the
ledger without the possibility to erase these data from all copies of
the ledger, including even data treated worldwide as illegal, such as
child abuse content [52, 93] and (ii) where personal data are trans-
ferred to the third countries without legal basis and protection for
data subjects. Contrary to exceptional access, the blacklisting sys-
tem, in its current stage of development, does not simultaneously ad-
dress the needs of both the GDPR and the AML/CFT with respect to
the privacy-blockchains. As presented above, the zero-knowledge
proof cryptography is today seen as one of the most promising meth-
ods that may enable, with appropriate systems architecture, the
achievement of the data anonymity threshold defined by the GDPR
on permissionless blockchains’ ledgers.
Towards reconciliation between the GDPR and
AML/CFT: proposed solutions
In the scope where the GDPR applies to data processed on permis-
sionless blockchains’ ledgers, the level of data protection required
by this regulation should be met. National and global policy
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towards permissionless blockchains should not combat the oper-
ation of networks that use advanced anonymization technologies on
the protocol level as a non-optional feature, provided that any ef-
fective AML/CFT tools or approaches are accessible for VASP or for
FIU on such privacy-blockchains. The governments should actively
search for such solutions and should use or create any possible tools,
even if they are more expensive or less convenient to use than a sim-
ple ban on VASPSs accepting any privacy-coins from another VASP.
The presented solution is aimed at expanding policy makers’ toolkits
of instruments used to govern permissionless DLT financial plat-
forms by adding to it a set of tools feasible in relation to privacy-
blockchains. Promoting of use of privacy-focused blockchains,
where the AML/CFT tools are available, is important from the priv-
acy protection point of view.
The proposed solution should complement rather than replace
existing AML policy instruments in relation to privacy-blockchains,
while at the same time ensuring the achievement of GDPR goals.
Thus, I do not suggest removing the VASPs’ KYC and the ‘travel
rule’ obligations. However, in relation to cryptocurrency underlying
privacy-blockchains, the VASP ability to trace the coins is limited.
That fact should not oblige them to refrain from transacting in such
virtual assets if the privacy-focused networks granted the FIU the ex-
ceptional access (as proposed below) or if any other possibility
existed in the future to gather transactional surveillance data by
FIU. As indicated above, the effective measures that would enable
the FIU or the VASPs to trace transactions made on privacy-focused
blockchains are not available today—and that absence is the main
reason why they are combated by the AML/CFT policies and why
the VASP refrain from transacting privacy-coins. It is always pos-
sible that such tools will be developed by blockchains developers or
by researchers in the future. However, as for today, the only AML/
CFT tool which seems to be feasible in relation to privacy-
blockchains is exceptional access, as proposed below.
Key elements of the proposed solution
The first proposed measure is the introduction of an optional regula-
tory instrument available for permissionless DLT-based privacy-net-
works granting the FIU exceptional access to some transactional
data as a reporting feature embedded in the network’s protocol.
Without such a regulation, the FIU is not allowed to verify, accept,
or use such access, even if offered by a network. That proposal
relates only to those networks which, by design, use anonymization
or strong pseudonymization technology to masque transactional
data. That scope includes the networks which would ensure, by de-
sign, the processing of data written on the ledger in a GDPR-
compliant way. That scope can also cover privacy-focused networks
which underlie the privacy-coins commonly delisted or rejected by
dExchanges (when the VASPs are not able to verify the source of
coins), even if such networks do not reach the level that would en-
able data anonymization in the sense reflected in the GDPR.
Depending on the anonymization technologies and the architecture
of the network, offering a reporting feature for the FIU seems to be
today the only feasible tool to protect data on the level required by
the GDPR (or at least, near this level) and at the same time to enable
effective AML/CFT screening. When access is granted by a network
and accepted by FIU, they would have to analyse data obtained
through ‘exceptional access using available analytical technologies
(today, VASPs are obliged to analyse and report these data to the
FIU).
The second proposal is to add to policy makers’ toolkits a set of
effective tools aimed at combating cryptocurrency of those privacy-
blockchains where virtual assets are transacted if (i) a network fails
to deploy the reporting feature and, at the same time, if (ii) no other
means or sources of surveillance data is available for the FIU to min-
imize AML/CFT risks.
A set of tools to combat privacy-coins may include means of a
different technological, regulatory, economic (fiscal) nature, also
including state attacks on underlying privacy-blockchains. The letter
tool, as possible regulatory access points of the blockchain space,
was already mentioned by Finck [16], however, without further ana-
lysis in that domain. The AML/CFT measures should concentrate on
the cryptocurrency of indicated networks, instead of targeting the
people who are members of their communities. The tools can and
should aim towards reducing the particular currencies’ value, conse-
quently inducing a voluntary outflow of their users.
This article is not intended to present all tools which may be
used to combat those cryptocurrencies. I rather suggest the general
direction towards shaping effective sanctions for non-compliance
with AML/CFT requirements in anonymous blockchain space. In
subsequent subsections I analyse some aspects connected with that
issue. Some of the indicated tools (e.g. different kinds of attacks on
permissionless blockchains) have for a long time been a vital field of
interest among computer and cybersecurity scientists. However,
today these kinds of tools are not included in the AML/CFT policies,
and there is a lack of legal basis in AML/CFT regulations for their
use (at least, in European regulations). The indicated tools are dis-
cussed below from various perspectives.
Automatic reporting
The optional instrument of automated reporting as a feature
embedded directly into the blockchain protocols requires specifying
the scope and method of such reporting, as well as detailed rules for
processing data received by the government (FIU) as a result of this
reporting. Elements that must be defined when designing such ex-
ceptional access have been listed by a group of security experts and
computer scientists [9]. Although this list was concerned with pro-
viding exceptional access in Internet spaces and on mobile devices, it
is also helpful for the blockchain cyberspaces. Many issues identified
therein are addressed in this article.
Scope of data covered
The proposal for embedded reporting is addressed only to privacy-
blockchains. There is no need for exceptional access to transparent
blockchain ledgers because data on their ledgers are publicly view-
able and transactions are, more or less, traceable. Reporting from
privacy-blockchains should relate to certain available data, such as
public addresses engaged in a transaction, transaction ID, value of
the transactions, and any additional content added by the user to the
transaction. These data are accessible on privacy-blockchains for a
user depending on the features implemented in protocols. Users may
lift the cryptography veil of anonymization techniques.
Through proposed exceptional access to transactional data
related to the transactions on such financial platforms, the FIU could
gather and analyse the pseudonymized data which are currently hid-
den by zero-knowledge proof cryptography from the eyes of every-
one except the user. For example, with Bitcoin blockchain, Zcash
shielded transaction data are posted to a public blockchain; but un-
like Bitcoin, zero-knowledge proofs allow transactions to be verified
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without revealing the sender, receiver, or transaction amount.
Selective disclosure features within Zcash allow a user to share some
transaction details for the purposes of compliance or audit [94]. If
such disclosure features would be accessible, by design, for the FIU,
the FIU could analyse this data to identify the AML/CFT risks and
flag suspected transactions. However, analysing pseudonymized
data does not guarantee the FIU success in all cases. I address this
concern in the last section ‘Discussion of common concerns’.
Technology-neutral approach
Technical solutions for providing the automatic reporting feature on
permissionless blockchains can be based, for example, on develop-
ing the ‘viewing key’ functionalities deployed on some privacy-
blockchains such as Zcash [94]. This feature could ensure FIU access
to the details of transactions in the same form in which such details
are accessible to the user (the party to a given transaction). The
other example can be the technical solution for the modification and
optimization of the Monero system to create a regulatable privacy-
preserving blockchain which has already been proposed [33].
However, the law should not strictly define technological
requirements for such reporting functionalities. This could impede
the rapid development of technology. I would suggest adopting a
similar solution as accepted in the GDPR: legal regulations should
only indicate the expected result (functionality) at a very general
level, without pre-empting any technological details that must be
implemented by networks. Ensuring effective trustful FIU access to
specified transactional data, as well as possibilities of auditing such
access, should constitute such a result. The functionality embedded
in the blockchain protocol should ensure that transactions cannot be
approved without automated reporting to FIU or without ensuring
FIU access to the transactional details. It is the network community
that should both choose and deploy the right technological solutions
to achieve the required result. The auditing of solutions offered to
FIU should be practicably easier when taking into account that the
permissionless network’s software is open source.
KYC features
Another tool that may be considered—either instead of, or in paral-
lel with, the above-mentioned embedded reporting—is protocol-
level deployment of a KYC functionality. This is currently the direc-
tion of development of, for example, the Concordium blockchain
[95]. In such a case, the software should not allow transactions to be
added to the ledger without confirmation that the parties to the
transaction related to virtual assets have performed KYC trusted
procedure. The proofs of KYC performance by the external trustful
entity could be based on, for example, zero-knowledge proof crypt-
ography. The services of external decentralized identity (dID) [96]
providers could be used, assuming the relevant country has certified
them. This solution would significantly complicate the network
architecture in the global context. Each government could require
that the dID and KYC providers would be licenced within the given
state. It is most probable that not all providers would be able to ob-
tain a licence in all countries, especially if that licence meant that
dID and KYC providers had to accept their own readiness to reveal
the user’s identity as a result of a court or administrative order or
any of the FIU’s requirements. Some users, and even some govern-
ments, would be unwilling to accept that the identification of users
could be revealed at the request of any FIU from any country global-
ly. Moreover, making the network dependent on external trusted
dID providers would create the risk of blocking the entire network,
assuming an attack on a dID provider would involve the given net-
work’s central point of failure. The security of a network will be put
at risk. It seems that the feasibility of such a concept in highly decen-
tralized global networks is quite poor, if this approach is at all pos-
sible. Further research in that scope will be an interesting subject to
explore.
Functionalities of exceptional access
Legal requirements for providing certain functionalities in relation
to exceptional access should be limited to the absolute minimum ne-
cessary for mitigating AML/CFT risks. Creating overly extensive
requirements concerning such an instrument would jeopardize net-
work security and/or would make the permissionless technology
practically useless. For example, the requirement of providing to the
government the functionality of ‘seizure’ regarding virtual assets
(useful in, for example, enforcement proceedings) would not be an
appropriate policy tool, as this would open back doors that could be
used by hackers to steal currency. Even providing to the govern-
ment(s) the ability to freeze acceptance of transactions within the
network (e.g. in the case of identifying a virtual asset transfer to enti-
ties, which are subject to international AML/CFT sanctions), would
significantly complicate the system and expose it to hacking. The
feasibility of such a measure and its impact on the security of an en-
tire network would require in-depth cybersecurity analysis.
Automated reporting addressee: government(s)
In maintaining the simplicity of a networks’ architecture, it would
be optimal to include only a single FIU as an addressee of exception-
al access. However, achieving this on a global scale seems unlikely
[9]. This proposal is submitted assuming an absence of such inter-
national cooperation between all countries in the world.
Designing the architecture of exceptional access requires the
community to determine to which government (FIU) transactional
data are to be automatically reported. As indicated above, the
reported data may include only those data which are today visible
on privacy-focused blockchains and which are masqued on privacy-
blockchains by, for example, zero-knowledge proof cryptography.
This additional content can also include any data, either in plain
text or encrypted by the user. Most of these data (except those writ-
ten in plain text by user) would be pseudonymized. In such a situ-
ation, I see no reasonable general criterion for determining (on the
protocol level) one government (country) which should be the
reporting addressee if a network were to grant access to the FIUs of
a few countries or a few international organizations. However, this
does not constitute an obstacle for proposed tools where a network
grants access to many governments.
The data mentioned above, which should be reported to FIU, are
today publicly visible on transparent blockchains for everybody,
including every government. Therefore, it seems appropriate that
pseudonymized data from all transactions on non-transparent block-
chains are to be reported, in the same scope, to all those government
bodies to which a given network has granted exceptional access.
The ability of each government regarding the identification of trans-
action parties, basing on reported data, would differ. It would de-
pend on the analytical methods and technologies used by a given
government, as well as on the additional external data available to
that government. The data received by the government would only
be pseudonymous. Consequently, the chances to identify users and
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suspicious transactions based on data gathered through embedded
reporting would vary between countries.
Implementation of the proposed solution would ensure access to
transactional data only to governments chosen by a network com-
munity and not to everyone, as is the case with transparent block-
chains. Data reported to the governments are to be processed on the
basis of their national personal data protection regulations. Rules
and procedures for governments’ processing of personal data vary
significantly among countries. Within the EU, this processing is
regulated by the GDPR and the Directive 2016/680 on the process-
ing of data for the purpose of preventing and combating crime [97].
In particular, a country is obliged to erase all those personal data
where no legal basis for their processing exists. This obligation
would also include deleting the secret keys which would grant access
to such personal data on a ledger. The rules for governments’ proc-
essing of such data should be the same as those that apply when
FIUs process personal data received from the VASPs or any other
intermediaries in AML/CFT proceedings. That regulation should
allow for FIU gathering and analysing of the data gathered through
the embedded reporting only, as a rule, for AML/CFT purposes.
Transparency of embedded reporting
As permissionless software is open source, the reporting mechanisms
(architecture) would and should be transparent to all ecosystem
members. Each user would decide whether to use a given financial
platform, knowing which countries have been granted access to the
transactional data on that network. Today, every Bitcoin or
Ethereum 1.0 blockchain user must accept that all people and all
governments have access to all data recorded on network ledgers.
The optional character of embedded reporting
The implementation of reporting features into a blockchain protocol
is proposed as a free-to-choose option which may allow govern-
ments to accept the operation and mass use of privacy-blockchains.
The exceptional access should stay optional for privacy-focused net-
works as long as there are accessible for FIU any other effective
AML/CFT tools.
It is highly likely that some networks will not decide to imple-
ment them. However, some networks actively search for possibilities
for compliance with the GDPR and AML/CFT requirements.
Compliance with regulations may attract the mass of users to a
given network and place it into the mainstream. The proposed tool,
if accepted by regulators, may create an opportunity for permission-
less networks to design protocols and network architecture in a way
which would enable the GDPR-compliant processing of data, while
at the same time also enabling the AML/CFT screening. The nation-
al FIU should be allowed by law to accept such a tool if a network
offers it.
If there were any other approach or tool, which would enable
reaching the AML/CFT goals concerning privacy-blockchains, in
that situation the network’s community should be free with respect
to the decision of which technological option and network architec-
ture to implement. If available and helpful in meeting AML/CFT
needs, the FIU should also use any other tools, approaches, or sur-
veillance data sources external to the networks in a given set of cir-
cumstances. That is crucial for allowing technological innovation to
flourish. As pointed out above, that approach is similar to that
accepted by the GDPR: the regulations should set the general goals
and should require general effects but should not regulate the tech-
nology itself.
Embedded reporting should be optional for network as long as
other effective AML/CFT tools or sources of surveillance data were
accessible for FIU. When a network does not grant exceptional ac-
cess to a given government and, at the same time, if any other AML/
CFT measures or sources of surveillance data are not accessible for
FIU, the government should be allowed by the law to combat
privacy-coins. On the other hand, a government or international or-
ganization which has gained exceptional access to that network’s
transactional data should refrain from combating the cryptocur-
rency of such a financial platform. The VASPs which are under the
supervision of that state (or international organization) should be
allowed to accept privacy-coins underlying by that DLT
infrastructure.
Implementing exceptional access will likely discourage most
criminals, as well as participants in a shadow economy, from using
that network and its cryptocurrency. Often it may be a massive sec-
tion of users who abandon the network. Thus, the decision to imple-
ment the proposed tool may not be made easily, if at all. However,
if the community of a privacy-blockchain has opted not to grant FIU
exceptional access, and if, at the same time, effective AML/CFT veri-
fication would not be possible using any other means accessible to
the FIU, that network’s cryptocurrency can be, and should be, com-
bated by the government, including activities aimed at undermining
value of the network’s cryptocurrency.
Who should take care of an embedded reporting
feature?
Implementing any features into the blockchain protocol, including
any further updates, depends on the decision on the whole commu-
nity adopted according to its own rules of off-chain governance. The
decentralized governance of networks is a broad issue widely
described and analysed in the literature [64]. As a rule, the technical
details of the changes to blockchain protocol are proposed by block-
chain developers. In highly decentralized networks, the updates are
implemented only when a broad consensus is reached, and this con-
sensus is so evident that formal voting is not needed because the
major part of the community is cooperating towards the agreed
goals [98]. In decentralized governance, there is no central point of
decision within the community. Any significant decision regarding
the network architecture is discussed, as a rule, within the whole
community, including end-users. However, the rules of off-chain
governance are different for each blockchain community. The same
rules, specific to a given network, would apply to the decision con-
cerning the implementation of a reporting feature into the network’s
protocol.
Impact of proposed solution on the situation of
transparent permissionless blockchains
As emphasized above, exceptional access to masqued data is a rea-
sonable tool only for privacy-blockchains. That tool would not
interfere with the status quo of such permissionless DLT-based net-
works, which are sufficiently transparent for the VASP or FIU to
mitigate the ML/TF risk using any other means or approaches. The
level of network transparency for AML/CFT purposes today is veri-
fied in practice by VASPs, which delist or reject some cryptocurren-
cies assessing them as not traceable enough. In turn, the position of
VASPs is profoundly impacted by the supervisory FIU’s assessment.
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Each FIU should assess whether the transparency of a given ledger is
sufficient for the mitigation of ML/TF risk without granting excep-
tional access (reporting functionality).
However, as already pointed, we should bear in mind that mem-
bers of transparent blockchain communities face the legal risk be
qualified as (joint) controllers or processors under the GDPR. In
case of such qualification, infringement of the GDPR by processing
personal data on permissionless transparent ledgers is highly likely.
It may be definitely decided only on case-by-case basis.
Qualification of reported transactional data
under the GDPR
The qualification of data as pseudonymous or anonymous under the
GDPR is presented in detail above, including different possible
approaches. According to the relative approach accepted here, pro-
viding governments with exceptional access to transactional data on
public ledgers would not exclude the possibility of classifying such
data as anonymous from the perspective of community members. As
indicated by the CJEU in the Breyer case [78], information held by a
third person (in this case, the government) could be omitted when
assessing whether the data controller (e.g. dApp operator) could use
the information to identify a data subject if it was ‘prohibited by law
or practically impossible on account of the fact that it requires a dis-
proportionate effort in terms of time, cost and man-power, so that
the risk of identification appears in reality to be insignificant’ (para.
46 in [78]). In the case of granting exceptional access to the FIU, the
possibility of obtaining reported data by the dApp operators or by
any other member of the blockchain community from the FIU would
be—and should be—prohibited by law.
Outlawing the use of anonymity-enhanced vir-
tual assets and their underlying technology
Presently, the FATF does not recommend banning the anonymity-
enhanced virtual assets and blockchains, but it also does not exclude
such a solution. States have the discretion to prohibit virtual assets
activities or virtual assets service providers [27]. The main reason
for the recommendation is that banning such activities and services
would not reduce the states’ obligations regarding AML. After the
outlawing of anonymity-enhanced virtual assets and blockchains,
states will still need to actively monitor cyberspace to detect and
prosecute violations of the ban, just as they currently do when
detecting and prosecuting unregistered VASPs.
In a study prepared for the European Parliament [99], introduc-
ing the ban was considered as a possible AML/CFT policy
measure Experts warn that ‘we must avoid being naı̈ve, even if a ban
would be imposed, how do we detect a breach, given that the pur-
pose of the object of the ban just is to obscure identities’ [99].
Eventually, they are against the general bans on cryptocurrencies
because ‘[t]hat would go too far’ [99]. Instead, they suggest impos-
ing a ban ‘on specific aspects facilitating the illicit use of cryptocur-
rency’ [99].
The above indicated proposal to ban only ‘certain aspects’ facili-
tating the abuse of technologies and anonymization techniques asso-
ciated with permissionless DLT networks, however, carries the same
‘risk of naı̈veté’ as would a general ban. When prohibiting the use of
privacy-coins or ‘only’ the use of anonymization features, it seems to
be equally tricky, and sometimes impossible, to detect users violat-
ing each of these bans. Therefore, limiting the ban on the use of
anonymity-enhanced features does not solve problems relating to
the enforceability of such a ban. The ban on the use of anonymity-
enhanced cryptocurrency and its underlying DLT-based network
would not be a reasonable tool if the sanctions for failing to comply
with the ban were limited to traditional criminal sanctions. The en-
forcement of these sanctions requires bringing an accused person to
court. Such a person often would not be detected, as long as they ef-
fectively continue to break the ban using anonymity-enhanced per-
missionless blockchains. Nevertheless, as the experts indicate, it is
worthwhile to consider introducing a ban because ‘if authorities
bump into the prohibited activities, they have a legal basis for pros-
ecution, insofar not yet available’ [99].
Imposing such a ban on the use of anonymity-enhanced crypto-
currency, where reporting features are not provided and any other
AML tools or sources of surveillance data are not available to FIU,
is vital for a different reason, as presented below.
Towards effective tools for combating non-
transparent permissionless DLT-based networks
It is emphasized in the literature that while backdoors seem technic-
ally feasible, it is unlikely that they can be sustained in decentralized
systems, whose raison d’ ê: tre is the rejection of privileged parties
with special access rights [91]. I see the needs to create means which
could motivate decentralized systems to accept limited access rights
needed for the achievement of AML/CFT objectives. It should in-
duce the process of shaping the permissionless networks in the direc-
tion required by law, to make the systems respectful of some
fundamental values which are protected by systems of law, for ex-
ample, of privacy and public security (the AML/CFT risks
minimization).
Why people comply with laws and regulations is complex
and controversial within criminology. Empirical research projects
have identified variables that are critical for law-abidingness in
individuals. Researchers have found that although the severity of
punishment is an effective deterrent [100], the probability of
punishment is also a crucial factor. ‘[S]ome significant level of
legal enforcement is essential in generating and assuring compli-
ance’ [101]. Therefore, regulators may induce shaping the archi-
tecture of permissionless DLT-based networks in the direction
required by the law only if legal requirements were feasible and
if sanctions for non-compliance could be effectively enforced. As
indicated above, the use of anonymity-enhanced technologies,
such as, for example, zero-knowledge proofs, would result in
low enforceability of criminal sanctions. Such technologies are
continually being developed and implemented into new plat-
forms. In my opinion, the impact of threatening communities’
members with criminal sanctions would not be sufficient to in-
duce shaping the blockchain protocol and architecture in the dir-
ection desired by the governments. Moreover, even successful
enforcement of a criminal sanction against some individual mem-
bers of the ecosystem will hardly affect the efficiency and oper-
ation of the highly decentralized network. Consequently,
traditional criminal sanctions from government, which had to be
enforced individually against particular members of ecosystems,
appear to no longer be sufficient to motivate all members of glo-
bally decentralized community to shape architecture of networks
in the direction expected by governments. As decentralized net-
work governance is sometimes it is summarized ‘[n]o regulatory
agency has the resources to go after that type of Medusa-like en-
tity’ [102].
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Targeting the privacy-cryptocurrency, not its
users
Taking into account the above findings, instead of going after
privacy-blockchains communities’ members to punish them, these
tools should be, in my opinion, directed against privacy-
cryptocurrency that creates ML/FT risks which cannot be overcome
using any available approaches. The focus should be on the direct
source of risk to public safety, not on the people which create that
risk. An analogy to the off-chain world is where enforcement law
agencies directly targeted the building constructed in violation of
building regulation, and destroyed it rather than—or in addition
to—targeting people responsible for the building’s construction. The
ultimate aim of new tools in the blockchain space should be to re-
duce the economic value of the outlawed native cryptocurrency
whose value drives the operation of a given platform, in particular
by reducing trust in the stability and security of the network. If ef-
fective, means that reduce the value of the cryptocurrency will there-
fore reduce the number of the network’s users and nodes. The
decreasing number of users and nodes (and thus the decreasing in-
frastructural and political decentralization [66]) should automatical-
ly reduce blockchain security. Networks underlying the privacy-
coins will then become more vulnerable to further attacks on their
currencies or any activities reducing the value of given privacy coins,
which can be systematically repeated by a government until the vir-
tual assets cease to be accepted for payments or used for investment
purposes. There is a need for in-depth interdisciplinary research to
identify and analyse in detail the whole spectrum of different tools
which may help policy makers to govern the permissionless privacy-
blockchain space without going after the members of the commun-
ities. The nature of possible conceivable tools that can reduce the
value and trust in the outlawed (or blacklisted) virtual assets vary
significantly, including technological, economic, fiscal, sociological,
and legal means. As indicated above, this article is not intended to
describe and analyse all these possible tools. This article’s goals in
that scope are to indicate this direction (targeting the value of
privacy-cryptocurrency, not its users), where the effective tools can
be found, as in my opinion most promising for further exploration
by policy makers. The second goal of the article is to indicate some
of these tools to consider by regulators, namely embedded reporting
(presented above) and state attacks on outlawed privacy-coins.
State attacks on the value of outlawed privacy-
coins
Each permissionless network’s security and the value of its native
cryptocurrency depend on the mass usage of that network and its
cryptocurrency, which, in turn, depends on the prospective trust of
persons in and around blockchain ecosystems regarding the net-
work’s security and their acceptance of a given currency as a means
of payment. The users’ confidence in the networks may be signifi-
cantly undermined by successful attacks on networks which could
undermine the trust of the blockchain community in the ability of
the network’s protocol to ensure smooth operation of the network.
By smooth operation I mean particularly the operation without the
double-spending of coins, with high level of scalability, and without
the risks of gathering by one or few governments enough control to
could manipulate the system.
The effects, chances, and costs of successful attack vary signifi-
cantly—they depend on the network size (level of decentralization)
and type of network consensus (e.g. 51% or Sibil attack for net-
works based on the proof of work [103, 104] or the proof of stake
[105]), but also on many other elements of the system’s architecture.
The levels of decentralization also differ substantially within net-
works. The idea of decentralization of permissionless DLT-based
networks is aimed at excluding all central points of failure within a
network’s architecture. However, in practice, some elements of cen-
tralization do occur [66], which is observable, for example, in rela-
tion to different consensus algorithms. Permissionless networks’
points of failure usually result from various compromises in the
architecture of a given blockchain [106], which are needed to simul-
taneously ensure many desirable network properties such as scalabil-
ity, decentralization, security (including anonymity or strong
pseudonymity), and low operation costs. The need to strengthen
some of these properties often, at the same time, weakens others,
causing networks to be vulnerable to different type of attacks [106].
As researchers point out, despite common arguments about the
prevalence of blockchain technology in terms of security, privacy,
and immutability, in reality, several attacks can be launched against
these networks [107]. Attacks on some permissionless blockchains
have failed so far because attacking them is cost-effective for attack-
ers who launch an attack to gain profits. However, the profitability
of an attack would not be the primary determinant for the states.
This article is not intended to describe the technology of attacks
nor to suggest states use one of them. The AML/CFT policy should
adopt a technology-neutral approach in that scope and should avoid
determining the techniques of attacks on cryptocurrency. The secur-
ity experts should decide which technology is appropriate to be used
on a case-by-case basis. To return to the building metaphor, specific
methods of building demolition by law enforcement bodies are not
determined by legal regulations because the appropriate means
depends on the targeted building’s architecture. The same is true for
DLT permissionless platforms. Some features are similar among net-
works, but some are different, for example, different cryptography
methods and architectures, varying levels of decentralization and
different off-chain governance. No two permissionless distributed
ledgers are identical, so the appropriate methods of attack could
more or less differ.
As DLT continues to develop quickly and network decentraliza-
tion increases, the challenges in identifying and developing a success-
ful method of attack on the value of a cryptocurrency will continue
to grow [108]. Facebook’s current effort to launch the permission-
less DLT-based network, which will underly OpenLibra cryptocur-
rency, shows the possible scale of the challenges faced by
governments worldwide. Because of the possible colossal decentral-
ization of some networks in the future, it might be impossible for a
single government to impact those networks’ ecosystems effectively.
In such a situation, cooperation among many governments may be-
come fruitful.
Outlawing of certain virtual assets
The outlawing (banning) of the use of certain virtual assets and their
underlying network is, in turn, a legal measure useful for combating
a privacy-cryptocurrency if AML/CFT purposes may not be
achieved in relation to a particular network in any other ways.
However, I do not see the primary purpose of such regulation creat-
ing a basis for criminal prosecution against people who breach that
law. That ban will likely be so consequential that the outlawed cryp-
tocurrency will not be used in transactions which parties intend to
report to FIU or any other supervisory body. Moreover, such a law
may also discourage the participation of a significant number of
those network’s users who prefer to comply with regulations
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regardless of threatening sanctions. The outflow of some users from
the network can weaken that network’s security. Effective attacks
on a network cryptocurrency, distorting the network’s operational
stability, will demonstrate the state’s ability to implement such
tools. In turn, this should further reduce the outlawed cryptocur-
rency’s value, thereby reducing the economic significance of a given
cryptocurrency. The proposed solution will not have a physical im-
pact, and any hardware infrastructure and the targeted DLT-based
network can continue to operate until the last single node (and user)
records transactions on its ledger. However, the trust and currency
value of such a network can drop to zero. Such a cryptocurrency
may no longer be accepted as a means of payment and may cease to
have the legal status of being a virtual asset. If cryptocurrency is no
longer qualified as within the realm of virtual assets, the AML/CFT
rules do not apply to it because such a cryptocurrency no longer
poses ML/FT risks. In that case, governments should refrain from
further interference in that network’s operation because such a net-
work has lost the character of a financial platform.
Legal basis for combating a problematic
cryptocurrency
To combat some cryptocurrency, including state activities aiming at
reducing the value of cryptocurrency, the governments need to
adopt a legal basis for interference in several human rights of com-
munity members. A necessary element of such regulation is setting
out prerequisites for using such a tool towards certain privacy-coins.
At minimum, such prerequisites should refer to the lack of availabil-
ity of any other tools, approaches, or external sources of surveillance
data that could effectively allow the FIU to limit the AML/CFT risks
in relation to a given network. If a given network enables anonym-
ization of processed data (as defined by the GDPR), it is highly likely
that there are no other tools and approaches that would allow for
the achievement of AML/CFT objectives; however, it cannot be
excluded a priori. All circumstances related to a given network must
be assessed.
Defining sanctions for non-compliance of privacy-blockchains
with AML/CFT requirements should be the second element of such
regulations. As pointed out above, these sanctions should not be tar-
geted only against individual actors within the network, but rather
against its currency. In the off-chain world, we use similar sanctions,
regardless of the possibility of identifying and punishing the individ-
uals who are responsible for breaching the rules.
State attacks on cryptocurrency as a last-resort
policy tool
The attack on cryptocurrency is proposed to be included in national
or international policies towards permissionless privacy-blockchains
as a last-resort tool. It should be targeted only against those DLT-
based financial platforms where no other means are available to
achieve AML/CFT objectives. If any available approaches of mini-
mizing AML/CFT are effective, there is no reason to attack, nor
should be legal grounds for attacking, any network nor its crypto-
currency. In such a case, an attack could be non-proportional inter-
ference in human rights (as it is elaborated in the next subsection).
Concept of gradual application of different AML/CFT policy
tools can be understood with an analogy used earlier. If somebody
built a building with such serious breaches of construction law that
the building jeopardized public security, demolishing this building is
(and should be) the means of last resort for a law enforcement body.
The regulations usually require other means to be applied before the
building is destroyed as a law enforcement tool. These other meas-
ures, which should be used primarily if they are accessible and effi-
cient, are aimed at maintaining the building by means of ordering
the owner to bring the building into compliance with the construc-
tion regulations. That is, and should be, a consequence of the re-
quirement of proportional interference with human rights (see the
next section). The above considerations could also relate to permis-
sionless blockchains that underlie virtual assets (financial plat-
forms). If governments could use any other effective means to
minimize AML/CFT risks on privacy-blockchains, then those means
should be primarily used. In a situation where there are no feasible
means which may ensure achieving AML/CFT objectives in relation
to a given network and if embedded reporting will not grant, the
state should be entitled to use effective measures to combat the net-
work, including state attacks on its cryptocurrency.
It would be worthwhile to discuss in the future whether attacks
on permissionless networks may and should be used as a policy tool
to protect privacy if a network does not ensure GDPR-compliant
processing of data. It is doubtful whether it would be a proportional
interference in human rights. Today, the sanctions for GDPR non-
compliance are primarily severe fines for GDPR non-compliance (al-
though these sanctions can hardly reach most of the controllers’ and
processors’ assets if they are located outside the EU or if they are
located on permissionless ledgers and obfuscated by advanced ano-
nymization technologies). Using such a tool may perhaps be accept-
able in light of human rights rules if a transparent DLT-based
network community does not implement into the network architec-
ture any effective tools which would allow for fast removal of at
least content which is treated as illegal worldwide, such as child
abuse content. However, I leave this problem for a future
discussion.
Proportionality and necessity of the interference
with fundamental rights
Regulatory adoption of new AML/CFT policy tools and, in a more
general sense, the adoption of new tools to combat crime, always
requires the tools’ prior assessment in light of several fundamental
human rights. Any state’s interference that affects software which
operates in cyberspace, including permissionless and open-source
software, may also potentially interfere in the rights and freedoms of
the people creating these ecosystems. The fundamental rights and
freedoms of persons in and around permissionless DLT-based eco-
systems that may potentially be affected by AML/CFT policy tools
are already identified in the literature [13]. These rights and free-
doms include, among others, the right to property for owners of vir-
tual assets, freedom to pursue a trade or profession for owners and
operators of platforms, freedom of expression (in the context of
software design), freedom of telecommunication, data privacy
rights, freedom of association within blockchain communities
organized as peer-to-peer systems, and freedom of information [13].
However, these rights and freedoms are not protected uncondi-
tionally by legal systems. Taking here a European perspective, I
focus on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (henceforth,
the Charter) [109] and the European Convention on Human Rights
(the Convention) [110]. The Charter is strictly consistent with the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). According to Art. 52(3)
of the Charter, insofar as the Charter contains rights which corres-
pond to rights guaranteed by the Convention, the meaning and
scope of those rights under the Charter, including authorized






/cybersecurity/article/7/1/tyab004/6166133 by guest on 23 M
arch 2021
limitations, are the same as in the Convention [111]. In any case, the
level of protection afforded by the Charter may never be lower than
that guaranteed by the Convention [111].
According to Art. 52 (1) of the Charter [82], which relates to the
scope of protection and interpretation of rights and principles, ‘any
limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by
the Charter must respect the essence of those rights and freedoms;
subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made
only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general
interest recognized by the Union or the need to protect the rights
and freedoms of others’. The text of the Convention does not con-
tain a similar general provision, but a similar rule may be interpreted
from limitations of protected rights and freedoms included in
detailed provisions relating to the specific rights or freedoms. For ex-
ample, the Convention’s Art. 8 allows for interference in private life
‘if it is necessary for a democratic society’. The ECHR has clarified
this requirement, stating that the notion of ‘necessity’ for the
Convention’s Article 8 means that the interference must correspond
to a pressing social need, and, in particular, must remain propor-
tionate to the legitimate aim pursued (§212 in [112), 113]. To be
deemed compatible with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention, the interference in property rights must fulfil certain
criteria: it must comply with the principle of lawfulness and pursue
a legitimate aim by means reasonably proportionate to the aim
sought to be realized (§108–114 in [114), 115]. Such legitimate aims
constitute, for example, the prevention of disorder or crime and the
protection of the rights of others [116]. Thus, the fundamental rights
of an individual should always be weighed against the public interest
and the rights and freedoms of others. An examination of the incur-
sion limitations upon fundamental rights in terms of their propor-
tionality and necessity is needed. The search for this balance is
inherent in the whole of the Convention [115].
As pointed out above, on the one hand, combating the privacy-
coins (and as a result, combating permissionless privacy-
blockchains) by AML/CFT policy tools would not be appropriate
where there are any other approaches or any other sources of sur-
veillance data accessible to the FIU. The governments should active-
ly search for such tools, including exploring data sources external to
networks. It follows from ECHR case law that to determine the pro-
portionality of a general measure taken by the state, the court must
primarily assess the legislative choices underlying it (§82–84 [117]).
On the other hand, however, if no other effective tools were avail-
able for FIU, state attacks on a given privacy-cryptocurrency can be
justified in the light of the Convention and the Charter, even if it
involves interference with the rights and freedoms of actors in an-
onymous DLT-based ecosystems.
When assessing the need to interfere with the fundamental rights
of the actors of these ecosystems, we should not rely on the trad-
itional model relating to the scope of protection of the fundamental
rights of Internet users. In many respects, Internet spaces differ sig-
nificantly from those of permissionless DLT-based networks.
Current AML instruments are ineffective in anonymous or strongly
pseudonymous spaces. Furthermore, in the case of the Internet, law
enforcement agencies have (limited) possibilities to access personal
data through the centralized operators of systems used to provide fi-
nancial or telecommunication services. In the case of permissionless
blockchains, no such centralized administrators exist from which
law enforcement agencies could obtain surveillance data. Sometimes
Internet Service Providers are indicated as a possible source of sur-
veillance data [16]. However, Internet access is not necessary to use
permissionless DLTs. Some of these network’ users emphasize that
‘the internet is a vulnerability’, continuing, ‘They are using satellites,
ham radios, and mesh networks to stay current on the
cryptocurrency. . . For those wary of tracking and censorship, ana-
logue signals—through satellites and land-based radio devices—
offer a welcome buffer from central control’ [118]. The proportion-
ality and necessity of crime-combating policy tools within Internet
ecosystems significantly vary when compared with permissionless
DLT-based space. Consequently, limitations to governmental inter-
ference in the fundamental rights and freedoms of these ecosystems’
actors may also be different.
When assessing the legality of infringement by AML/CFT tools
with the fundamental rights of networks’ members, we must also
bear in mind that the elementary functions of these networks are
much closer to financial institutions (banks, payment institutions)
than they are to messenger applications. One of the main differences
between traditional financial institutions and permissionless DLT-
based networks is that the latter operate under decentralized govern-
ance. However, in my opinion, different technology (network) gov-
ernance is not a sufficient reason for exemption of permissionless
privacy-networks from the scope of AML/CFT policy. The new
AML/CFT tools should be adopted to the permissionless privacy-
networks. If any measures minimizing ML/TF risks (as blacklisting,
exceptional access or any other source of transactional surveillance
data) are not accessible in relation to a given platform, either for the
VASP or for the FIU, such financial platform should be effectively
combated by governments.
Concerning the assessment of legality relating to proposed
embedded reporting, it is also important to note that the access
would cover only pseudonymized data. Governments should not
allow these data to be used beyond the need arising from the AML/
CFT policy. Presently, financial institutions worldwide constantly
collect and analyse all our data before reporting them to governmen-
tal agencies. Gathering these data by FIU, directly through
embedded reporting and without the use of intermediaries, would be
justified when the VASPs are not able to mitigate the AML/CFT
risks, as in the case of privacy-blockchains.
Subject the above conditions, if any effective AML/CFT meas-
ures are not available for FIU in relation to a given privacy-
blockchain, then combating by the states the value of its privacy-
coins (including using state attacks on the cryptocurrency as a last
resort tool), can constitute a proportional and necessary interference
with the fundamental rights of persons in and around DLT-based
permissionless networks.
Compliance with public international law
According to the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime (UNTOC)29 [119], states must carry out their
UNTOC obligations in a manner consistent with the principles of
sovereign equality and territorial integrity of states and that of non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of other states. The Charter of
the United Nations (UN Charter) elaborates on the principle of non-
intervention for matters that are ‘essentially’ within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state [120]. According to the judgement of the
Permanent Court of International Justice in the ‘Nationality Decrees
in Tunis and Marocco’ case [121], the term ‘essentially’ in the UN
Charter’s non-intervention clause reflects an evolutionary concep-
tion of this principle. Whether a given matter is within a state’s do-
mestic affairs depends on the development of international law.
29 Article 4(1) UNTOC.






/cybersecurity/article/7/1/tyab004/6166133 by guest on 23 M
arch 2021
Whenever a subject area is regulated by treaty-based or customary
rules of international law, it ceases to belong exclusively to the do-
mestic jurisdiction of states that are bound by those rules (Art. 2(7)
No. 20 in [122, 123]). Thus, combating transnational organized
crime such as ML/FT is not solely within the scope of a state’s do-
mestic affairs.
State jurisdiction is an emanation of sovereignty [124]. The juris-
diction in international law encompasses three distinct powers: juris-
diction to prescribe, jurisdiction to execute, and judicial jurisdiction.
The first describes state competence to prescribe legal rules, while
the second implies state authority to enforce the prescribed rules
[124, 125]. The difference between them is significant. Prescriptive
jurisdiction may be exercised extraterritorially without the consent
of other states. The state may, for example, prohibit and threaten
sanctions for the conduct which directly harms its public interest,
even when perpetrators are abroad. It is accepted in international
law that the state may criminalize conduct without any direct con-
nection to it if that conduct harms the international community as a
whole [126]. The ML/FT activity often harm the international com-
munity as a whole. Thus, the ‘jurisdiction to prescribe’ would allow
national legislators to include in their national regulations, as AML/
CFT tools, the proposed optional embedded reporting or state
attacks on cryptocurrency of privacy-blockchains.
In contrast, a state may not exercise its ‘jurisdiction to execute’
on the territory of another state without the other state’s consent
[124–126]. That rule creates the need to determine where the ‘terri-
tory’ of a state extends in cyberspace. More and more attention is
dedicated to the question of whether and to what extent the rights
and duties derived from the principle of ‘territorial’ sovereignty do
apply to cyberspace [127]. The discussions are underway [127–129].
Neither the UN Charter nor any other convention provides an an-
swer. The UNTOC and the 2001 Convention on Cybercrime [130,
131] are quite old and do not take into account the specificity of
DLT. Fast technological development hampers reaching a clear and
unified position on this matter at an international level. There seems
to be consensus amongst states only that customary international
law is, in principle, applicable to cyberspace, although there may be
a need for a consensual adaptation its rules to the specific character-
istics of cyberspace [127].
Although jurisdiction in cyberspace is debated between states,
more and more claims are brought before the courts where the ques-
tion of the borders of sovereignty in cyberspace needs to be
answered without waiting for conclusions from an international
debate.
The CJEU recently issued a judgement related to the jurisdiction-
al problem in cyberspace in the case ‘Google versus Commission
Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL)’ [132].
According to the GDPR,30 this regulation applies, inter alia, to the
processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the EU, by a
controller or processor not established in the EU, where the process-
ing activities are related to the offering of goods or services to data
subjects in the EU, irrespective of whether a payment is required.
CNIL served formal notice to Google indicating that, when granting
a request from a natural person for links to web pages to be removed
from the list of results displayed following a search conducted based
on that person’s name, Google must apply that removal to all its
search engine domain name extensions, all over the world (para.
30–31 in [132]). Google challenged this decision, arguing that the
right to data removal does not require that the links at issue are to
be removed, without geographical limitation, from all its search
engine’s domain names. Besides, Google argued, by adopting such
an interpretation, the CNIL disregarded the principles of courtesy
and non-interference recognized by public international law (para.
38 in [132]). During the proceedings, Google implemented a new
layout for the national versions of its search engine, in which the do-
main name entered by the Internet user (e.g. ‘google.fr’ or ‘google.-
com’) would no longer determine the national version of the search
engine accessed by that user. The Internet user, being on EU terri-
tory, would now automatically be directed to the national version of
Google’s search engine that corresponds to the place from which the
user is presumed to be searching, and the results of that search are
displayed according to that place, which is determined by Google
using a geo-location process. The CJEU eventually stated that, fol-
lowing the rules of international law, the GDPR does not extend the
subject data rights beyond the territory of the EU, and it does not
impose on an operator (which, like Google, falls within the scope of
that regulation) an erasure obligation which also concerns the na-
tional versions of its search engine that do not correspond to the EU
Member States (para. 70 in [132]). It is for the search engine oper-
ator to take, if necessary, sufficiently effective measures to ensure
the protection of the data subject’s fundamental rights. Those meas-
ures must have the effect of preventing or, at the very least, seriously
discouraging Internet users in the EU from gaining access to the links
in question using a search conducted based on that data subject’s
name (para. 70 in [132]).
The GDPR does not define the notion of ‘the territory’ in cyber-
space. Thus, the cyber borders, in which the national data supervi-
sors may enforce the law, were reconstructed by the CJEU in the
Google case as the accessibility of data from a physical territory.
Where the access to the data from the EU territory is not possible or
at least ‘seriously discouraging’, the EU territory in cyberspace ends.
It is easy to note that this approach results in overlapping juris-
dictions of many states in cyberspace. If some data in cyberspace are
accessible (without seriously discouraging access) from the physical
territory of a certain state, the data are within its cyberterritory. If
the data are accessible from the territory of many states (e.g. from
the territory of the USA and the EU), the data controller must accept
that law enforcement bodies of all these states will execute tools pre-
scribed in their national laws. Thus, the possible conflicts of law en-
forcement tools executed by different states seem unavoidable and
may be resolved by courts in future disputes, which may, in turn, in-
duce more detailed regulations on an international level.
According to the current position of the European Commission,
the diversity of cases that can lead to the tension between a global
Internet and national jurisdictions means that they may and should
not be addressed by one single mechanism (point 10 in [128]). In my
opinion, the criterion of determining the borders of jurisdiction to
execute, accepted by the CJEU in ‘Google vs CNIL’, should be
applied respectively also to permissionless blockchains. Certainly, it
is not an appropriate criterion to be applied in the cyber domain in
all cases where there is a need to determine the borders of states’
jurisdictions to execute. However, that criterion seems to be appro-
priate for the AML/CFT policy tools proposed here. When a
privacy-blockchain does not grant exceptional access for a state
from whose territory that blockchain is accessible, nor there are any
other tools or sources of surveillance data able to limit the ML/FT
risks, the application of the tools proposed here to combat such a fi-
nancial platform (its cryptocurrency) should be covered by that
state’s jurisdiction to enforce. That claim relates only to the means
of combating a cryptocurrency because implementing exceptional
30 Article 3(2) GDPR.
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access is not possible to enforce and should be left to the free deci-
sion of a network as an optional instrument. Therefore, for the plat-
form which enables, by design, data anonymization, but at the same
time does not grant exceptional access, nor are any other data sour-
ces for AML/CFT screening are available for FIU, that network will
suffer the threat of attacks from the side of all the states from whose
territory the system is accessible (except for seriously discouraging
access). I do not see any other reasonable criterion that could be the
basis for determining the borders of the states’ enforcement jurisdic-
tions in relation to the analysed problem in permissionless block-
chain spaces. Following the prevalent view, I also reject the
positions that the borders and the state’s jurisdictions disappear in
the permissionless blockchain sphere, and that any state would not
be allowed in any case to interfere with such blockchain activity
without the consent of all other states. This position (rejected here)
would result in the excluding effective law enforcement activity in
permissionless blockchain spaces.
It is also worth emphasizing that proposed attacks should even-
tually aim at the value of specific privacy-coin. They cannot interfere
with the integrity or functionality of the systems—what is often
qualified as violations of territorial sovereignty [127]. The attacker
is not able to erase data or change data written on hardware located
on the territory of the state, because the unified version of the ledger
is distributed and agreed upon between all nodes worldwide. The
distributed architecture ensures the safety of the ledger content. The
attacker, using its computational power or its own ‘stake’ (as a coin
holder), may try, however, to reach a double-spending effect. The
attacker, proceeding in a manner that is determined by the system’s
protocol, adds a new ‘double spending’ transaction to the ledger, as
any other user may do having enough computational power, stake,
or other resources (depending on the given protocol and the type of
attack). By doing so, the attacker exploits the features of the proto-
col according to its rules. It is very doubtful whether using the public
and permissionless system according to its rule could be qualified as
a violation of territorial sovereignty of all the states where the nodes
(and hardware) of that network are located, even though such activ-
ity usually causes a drop in the value of the underlying cryptocur-
rency. Recent studies show that it is not clear in light of
international law whether any unauthorized cyber intrusion would
violate the target state’s sovereignty, or whether there is a threshold
in operation [133]. The analysed activity can be compared to the
situation where a state starts to play a publicly accessible game and
constantly wins against other players using its huge computing
power. As a result, that state discourages other players from using
that game, and in turn, the value of the game and the value of the
game’s tokens fall down. A public announcement of that state that
in a few days the state will start to play another similar game may
hardly be qualified as a violation of the territorial sovereignty of the
states where the nodes are located, even though most players aban-
don that game immediately after that announcement. The measures
aimed at devaluing a national currency of another state, as well as
any other fiscal restriction against the currency of another state, is
not qualified as an intervention on the ‘territory’ of another state in
the meaning of public international law.
It is pointed out that further state practise and opinio iuris may
give rise to an emerging cyber-specific understanding of sovereignty.
Because the prospects of a general treaty in this area are still far
away, there would be easier to adopt limited rules before tackling
broad principles [133] (for example, on a prohibition on attacking
critical infrastructure). Following this approach, it would be desir-
able to achieve consensus on an international forum about an inter-
pretation according to which the state attacks on permissionless
privacy-DLT networks for AML/CFT goals, as a last-resort tool, do
not infringe upon any state’s territorial integrity. In the absence of
such a consensus, the courts’ case law will shape cyber borders.
Comparison to the blacklisting approach
When comparing the proposed solution to the blacklisting ap-
proach, both are going in a similar direction, not targeting the users
but only the value of cryptocurrency. The results of applying the
blacklisting system are much more precise because it is not the
whole cryptocurrency that is targeted, but only those non-fungible
coins that were involved in criminal activity [47, 92].
However, as indicated above, the blacklisting system based on
transactions’ traceability is not feasible, taking into account its cur-
rent state of development, where advanced cryptography methods,
such as zero-knowledge proofs, are used. In contrast, the solution
proposed here is addressed to privacy-blockchains because those
networks are likely to enable the GDPR-compliant processing of
data when reaching the anonymization threshold (or, at least, stron-
ger pseudonymization than transparent blockchains). The
approaches are not antagonistic, but rather, they can be supplemen-
tary. The search for AML/CFT tools which are feasible in an an-
onymous (or strongly pseudonymous) sphere aims at enabling the
privacy-coins to be accepted by intermediaries while at the same
time assuring protection of data written on ledgers, per the GDPR.
Implementation of such tools may facilitate the privacy-blockchains
come further into the mainstream use in financial sector. When com-
paring the proposed solution to the blacklisting approach, the first
one is aiming at enabling stronger protection of privacy/personal
data by feasibility of that approach within privacy-blockchains, es-
pecially within the networks which would enable GDPR-compliant
data processing. The blacklisting system, however, interferes less
with the fundamental rights of community members because black-
listing approach does not need any features to be implemented into
the networks protocols, and consequently the approach does not
need to threaten the networks’ communities with sanctions if desir-
able features were not embedded. However, both approaches do not
constitute mutually exclusive policy tools for governments to choose
between, because they are addressed to different kind of DLT net-
works (transparent and non-transparent), complementing one an-
other in the scope of AML policy tools in permissionless blockchain
spaces.
Discussion of common concerns
In this section, I address some main concerns which may arise in a
discussion relating to the proposed tools.
Concern: hindering innovation
The common concern which should be addressed is that personal
data protection regulations and the AML/CFT public policy prior-
ities impede innovation by imposing wide-scale restrictions on tech-
nology development. In order to reduce that tension, the regulations
should adopt a technology-neutral approach. The law should regu-
late not technology but only its use: the general purposes and values
which should be protected by the users of technology, regardless of
the technological developments.
The tools proposed in this article are addressed only to the per-
missionless DLT-based privacy networks. Thus, the scope of the
proposal is limited to financial platforms on which virtual assets are
transferred and where there is no central point of corporate
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responsibility to which AML/CFT obligations may be addressed.
There is no reason to impede the technology itself, but only some
means of use under decentralized governance. I propose to adopt the
technology-neutral approach in AML/CFT regulations as well. They
should create only the possibility (and not the obligation) for DLT-
based permissionless networks to grant exceptional access for the
FIU, without determining the technology of that instrument.
Taking into account the high GDPR requirements and the cur-
rent development of technology, I find exceptional access to be
today the only possible solution likely to allow reconciling the
GDPR with AML/CFT needs in the sphere of permissionless net-
works. However, if any other tools will be identified as being cap-
able of effectively minimizing AML/CFT risks on privacy-
blockchains, these tools should be accepted by AML/CFT policies as
an alternative to exceptional access. The embedded reporting should
remain optional for networks as long as any other effective AML/
CFT measures can be exploited by FIU or by the VASPs to minimize
the AML/CFT risk. These measures are not yet identified (as pre-
sented above in the section ‘Searching for solutions: Analysis of
existing proposals’), and as a consequence, the regulated VASPs in
their practice refrain from trading privacy-coins. Identification of
such measures is, and still should be, addressed by interdisciplinary
research on these matters. Only if (i) any effective AML/CFT tools
are not available and (ii) exceptional access is not granted to FIU,
combating of privacy-coins by state attacks should be allowed.
Combating privacy-blockchains infringes upon the fundamental
rights of community members and should be a tool of last resort (as
mentioned in the previous section).
To determine whether a particular infringement with fundamen-
tal right is necessary, balancing the interests of the state against the
rights of the individual is needed. The ECHR clarified that ‘neces-
sary’ in this context does not have the flexibility of such expressions
as ‘useful’, ‘reasonable’, or ‘desirable’, but rather it implies the exist-
ence of a ‘pressing social need’ for the interference in question.
National authorities have to make the initial assessment of the press-
ing social need in each case, but their decision remains subject to re-
view by the ECHR [113]. I would argue that ‘pressing social need’
combating a privacy-coins does not exist as far as there exist any
possibilities to achieve AML/CFT needs, for example, exceptional
access if offered by a network, or use of any other available ap-
proach or surveillance data source is possible.
As regards the exceptional access, it is aimed at creating the pos-
sibility for privacy-networks to avoid being targeted by states if
there are no other means accessible for an FIU to reach AML/CFT
objectives. Enabling privacy-networks to flourish is essential from
the privacy point of view. Only if any AML/CFT effective measures
or sources of surveillance data are not accessible for the FIU in rela-
tion to privacy-blockchains, granting exceptional access by net-
works should become mandatory and should be combined with the
threat of combating privacy-coins. That position seems to be similar
to the position taken by security and policy experts in the ‘Going
Dark’ debate [134]. The experts indicated that the government
should explore new opportunities which arise from technological
developments to gather surveillance data from different accessible
sources and should do so instead of providing law enforcement with
‘exceptional access’ to encrypted communications [134, 135]. I pro-
pose in the article that exceptional access should stay optional for
privacy-focused networks as long as there are accessible for FIU any
other effective AML/CFT tools. That proposal is aiming to create a
proper balance between public security, data protection, and innov-
ation. However, the difference between the messenger applications
and the smartphones, on the one hand, and privacy-blockchains, on
the other hand, is that in relation to these former technologies the
experts indicate that alternative sources of surveillance data exist
[90, 134]. The feasible AML/CFT tools which can be an effective al-
ternative to exceptional access as regards privacy-focused networks
that use anonymity-enhanced technology have not yet been identi-
fied. It is always possible that the development of research will cre-
ate such alternative tools feasible in privacy-blockchain spaces.
Concern: Jeopardizing cybersecurity
The famous ‘Going Dark’ debate [134] touches the ongoing concern
on how to reconcile exceptional government access with the increase
in cybersecurity risks. Many cybersecurity and policy experts, such
as Landau, warn that ‘exceptional access is dangerous’ [135].
This article is not intended to negate the accuracy of cybersecur-
ity concerns related to messenger applications and smartphones.
However, most of the arguments raised in that debate are not rele-
vant or are less relevant for the DLT-based permissionless networks.
First, all participants in the ‘Going Dark’ debate accept the need
for and possibilities of embedding the exceptional access to software
used by the financial institutions, such as banks. Exceptional access
embedded in financial institutions’ systems is dangerous for the
assets recorded on bank accounts. However, there seems to be a con-
sensus on the global level that in relation to financial sector, the
AML/CFT interest prevails over the others. The DLT-based net-
works underlying virtual assets are much closer to the financial insti-
tution than to messenger applications. In contrast to them, publicly
viewable and immutable DLT ledgers of permissionless blockchains
are not designed to be used for communication purposes or storing
confidential intellectual property. Their primary goal is to enable
the transfer of value, as well as to create a trustful proof of the im-
mutability of any data, usually stored off-chain.
Second, exceptional access to data written on such networks
does not put confidential intellectual property at risk, if it is stored
off-chain as is common practice.
Third, the proposed embedded reporting relates only to the pseu-
donymized data on privacy-blockchain ledgers. These data are today
publicly visible on transparent blockchain ledgers, and transparency
of the data did not endanger the security of the most popular net-
works. The value of such data is significantly reduced for the aver-
age (non-state) attacker. In order to be helpful, these data need to be
further analysed, which requires a tremendous amount of external
data and the use of advanced analytical systems. In practice, those
resources are not commonly accessible.
Fourth, in contrast to providers of communication services and
products in the Internet space, the economic model of permissionless
DLT-based financial platforms does not rely on access to user data
to create revenue streams and product functionality, but instead, it
relies on mass use of cryptocurrency. Thus, network communities
are not motivated to reduce the strength of data encryption. On the
contrary, it seems that the strength of anonymity technologies in
newly launching networks is continuously growing. That is a trend
that should be supported by regulators because it helps to protect
personal data written on permissionless blockchains on a high level,
possibly a GDPR-compliant level. There is a need to adopt AML/
CFT tools as feasible in anonymous space without compromising
privacy protection. Allowing only transparent blockchains to grow
is not a desirable direction of developing this technology because, as
a result, we may have (and, in fact, we already have) publicly view-
able databases in cyberspace with non-removable content possibly
deeply infringing privacy, including child abuse content [52, 86].
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Five, to reduce the risk of third-party attacks on the access
granted to the FIU, the FIU may consider using other communica-
tions channels, outside the Internet. To improve security and control
over internal database management, the government should use per-
missioned DLT technology. Further analyses of the proposed tools
in the light of cybersecurity concerns are desirable.
Concern: access to pseudonymized data only
Exceptional access is proposed to grant to pseudonymized data
only. That restriction is an advantage in light of cybersecurity and
the protection of privacy, but at the same time, it is a significant
drawback from the AML/CFT perspective. As pointed out above, to
minimize ML/FT risks, advanced analysis of pseudonymized trans-
actional data and a large amount of external data are needed.
However, even if these resources are accessible and are used to ana-
lyse the ledger, they do not ensure the transactions’ traceability nor
users’ identification in each case. It is a desirable subject for further
research. Extensive research is being conducted worldwide to im-
prove the effectiveness of forensic analysis of data written on distrib-
uted ledgers (e.g. see the Titanium project [31]).
Concern: cooperation from all governments and
legal systems
One of the main concerns related to the proposed tools may be that
proposed tools require cooperation from all governments and the re-
spective legal systems. In my opinion, however, strict organizational
or regulatory cooperation between states is not absolutely needed
but can be highly fruitful.
As pointed above in the subsection ‘Automated reporting ad-
dressee: Government(s)’, exceptional access may be granted by a
network to one or many countries. It would be the network’s inde-
pendent decision. Countries that have been given access can share
the required data with other countries, based on multilateral cooper-
ation agreements concluded between many states in the scope of
exchanging information in criminal matters. The cooperation be-
tween countries may result in the conclusion of ‘mutual recognizing
agreements’ relating to permissionless DLT networks underlying vir-
tual assets, states without access to a permissionless network may
commit to respect it as long as the state which has such access will
cooperate in the scope of exchanging information in criminal
matters.
As indicated in the subsection ‘Compliance with public inter-
national law’, to enforce proposed tools of combating some privacy-
coins (as presented above), especially in relation to state attacks on
cryptocurrency, it is desirable to reach an international consensus
regarding the interpretation of jurisdictional borders in permission-
less DLT space. States’ practice, opinio iuris, and international
courts’ case law can pave the way for such a consensus to be reached
sooner rather than later.
Regarding the purely organizational aspect, attacks on a crypto-
currency can be launched by one state. It eventually depends on
which cryptocurrency is targeted and on the volume of necessary
resources and know-how. Highly decentralized and popular crypto-
currencies may, indeed, be resistant to attack from the country that
does not possess enough resources, such as, for example, computing
power, stake (tokens), or knowledge of cyber systems. In order to
gather enough resources, the cooperation of many countries is not
needed but may be highly desirable—either concerning a given net-
work or in general.
The forums for such international cooperation are already pre-
sent. For example, the FATF seems to show strong determination to
resolve the ML/FT problems generated by permissionless DLT.
Concern: regionality of blockchain networks
If the observed differences between systems of law (for example, in
the scope of data protection) are not be overcome by the permission-
less DLT, it can lead to the emergence of territorial blockchains.
That result has been envisaged by Zamfir, as one of the possible dir-
ection of permissionless blockchains development: one day, for ex-
ample, the ‘Ethereum USA’ might enforce US economic sanctions,
‘Ethereum Europe’ might enforce GDPR, while ‘Ethereum China’
might enforce capital control policies [98]. That would be undesir-
able effect because it would reduce the practical significance of per-
missionless DLT. However, as indicated for instance above in
regards the territoriality of the GDPR in the Internet space (see sec-
tion: ‘Compliance with public international law’), the regionaliza-
tion of technology is an unwanted but ongoing process which is
present not only in the scope of financial systems but even within
the communication technologies.
Summary
The article shows how the GDPR pushes permissionless DLT-based
networks to deploy anonymization or, at the very least, strong pseu-
donymization technologies to enable compliance of data processing
with GDPR requirements. At the same time, FATF’s anti money-
laundering policy instruments aim to combat these privacy-focused
networks. As a result, the regulations discussed are on a collision
course when it comes to permissionless DLT spaces.
To reconcile these policy objectives—the protection of personal
data and ML/FT prevention—I suggest adopting new policy meas-
ures as presented in this article. AML/CFT policymakers should
make an effort to find and establish the AML/CFT tools which
would allow the governments and the VASP to refrain from combat-
ing the privacy-focused networks which use anonymity-enhanced
technologies, such as zero-knowledge proof cryptography. Use of
anonymization or strong pseudonymization technologies is needed
to develop GDPR-compliant (or, at least, near GDPR-compliant)
permissionless networks. In turn, in order to establish growth condi-
tions for these networks, the VASPs should be allowed to trade the
privacy-coins.
One of the AML/CFT tools which may enable the VASP to ac-
cept the privacy-coins is embedded reporting: that is, exceptional ac-
cess for FIU. Blockchain communities themselves should decide on
the technological solutions appropriate for a given network for the
deployment of proposed new functionalities in their protocols. Legal
regulations should not determine the technological details of such
solutions. The proposal of exceptional access is aimed at helping
privacy-networks to reconcile the requirements of the GDPR and
the needs of AML/CFT policy if the network is looking for such
tools. As a result of deployment of this tool, a privacy-blockchain
should become acceptable for VASP from the AML/CFT point of
view, as well as for data protection supervisors, removing or at least
minimizing the risk of the GDPR non-compliance that community
members face today.
At the same time, it is also necessary to adopt enforceable sanc-
tions if no effective AML/CFT tool or external source of surveillance
data is available for FIU in relation to a given privacy-focused net-
work, and if the network does not grant exceptional access to FIU.
The sanctions for non-compliance should not, however, be aimed at
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or enforced against individual community members. Criminal penal-
ties, which require bringing the individuals to court, have low en-
forceability within anonymous and globally decentralized
environments. Instead, effective measures may directly target the
privacy-coins (virtual assets) and its value. The adoption of appro-
priate legal regulations is needed to create a legal basis for govern-
ments to use such measures, including state attacks on
cryptocurrency as a tool of last resort.
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34. Ibá~nez L, O’Hara K, Simperl E. On Blockchains and the General Data
Protection Regulation. Southampton: University of Southampton.






/cybersecurity/article/7/1/tyab004/6166133 by guest on 23 M
arch 2021
https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/422879/1/BLockchains_GDPR_4.pdf (10
March 2020, date last accessed).
35. Noether S, Mackenzie A. The Monero research lab. Ring Confidential
Trans Ledger 2016;1:1–18.
36. Bünz B, Bootle J, Boneh D, et al. Bulletproofs: short proofs for confiden-
tial transactions and more. In: 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (SP), San Francisco CA, 2018., 315–34.
37. Wu H, Wang F. A survey of noninteractive zero knowledge proof system
and its applications. Sci World J 2014;2014:1–7.
38. Guan Z, Wan Z, Yang Y, et al. BlockMaze: an efficient privacy-
preserving account-model blockchain based on zk-SNARKs. IACR
Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2019. https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1354.pdf
(10 March 2020, date last accessed).
39. Ben-Sasson E, Bentov I, Horesh Y, et al. Scalable, transparent, and post-
quantum secure computational integrity. Arch Tech Rep 2018;46: 1–83.
40. Xie T, Zhang J, Zhang Y, et al. Libra: succinct zero-knowledge proofs
with optimal prover computation. In: Boldyreva A, Micciancio D (eds.).
Advances in Cryptology—Crypto 2019, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science. New York: Springer, 2019.
41. Gao Y, Chen X, Chen Y, et al. A secure cryptocurrency scheme based on
post-quantum blockchain. IEEE Access 2018;6:27205–13.
10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2827203
42. Kumar A, Fischer C, Tople S, et al. A Traceability Analysis of Monero’s
Blockchain. In: Foley S, Gollmann G, Snekkenes E (eds), Computer
Security—ESORICS 2017, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. New
York: Springer International Publishing, 2017, 153–73.
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